Slight compensation for the Danes’ failure to take Hume seriously can perhaps be found in Hume’s scant attention to Denmark. Nothing like Voltaire’s letter appeared from his pen. The only mention of Christian VII in Hume’s letters is a reference to the nuisance of having a state visit from him in 1768 (during which, incidentally, Struensee was given an honorary doctorate by Oxford University). No mention is made of the declaration of liberty of the press, of Struensee’s fall, or of the scandal concerning Caroline Matilda, even though she was an English princess.

In summary, we have seen that to Danish-only readers in Denmark, David Hume would have been known first as a theorist of liberty of the press because his essay on that topic was the first of his works to be translated into Danish. It was translated as early as 1771 as a contribution to Danish pamphlet debates. It did not have a wide impact, at least as measured by references to it in contemporary and later literature, perhaps because the Danes had their own substantial literature on the pros and cons of liberty of the press, based on their own local experiences.

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Eclecticism Rediscovered

Ulrich Johannes Schneider


Not so long ago eclecticism was held to be little more than a non-systematic form of thinking or constructing, and still today that is the generally accepted meaning of the term. Moreover, eclecticism has lost its traditional bad reputation and seems increasingly attractive to late twentieth-century thought in search of non-dogmatic and non-systematic forms of philosophizing. At the same time, however, historians of philosophy are discovering that eclecticism was a distinct and important feature of European intellectual history. In particular eclecticism can be recognized within early modern thinking especially at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, and in France the philosophy of the nineteenth century can be seen as essentially eclectic until the revolution of 1848.

Whatever the significance of the postmodern state of mind, recent views concerning philosophical eclecticism are largely the product of researches into the history of philosophy. There is an obvious inclination of today’s intellectual historians to investigate background figures of European modernity. The increasing willingness of historians to enlarge the notion of philosophy in both its disciplinary and historical definition seems to be in agreement with a similar disposition of contemporary philosophers. As we can learn from Michael Albrecht’s and Patrice Vermeren’s books, a critical appreciation of eclecticism throws light both on the conditions of contemporary philosophizing and on the politics of philosophy in the modern age.

What Albrecht does in his encyclopedic examination of eclectic ideas is very different in scope and method from Vermeren’s study of Cousin. How-

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21 The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford, 1932), II, 184. The research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the American Philosophical Society; thanks also to Johannes Laursen and Poul-Henning Laursen for research assistance.
ever, both authors address philosophy as a university discipline, and both sug-
est that eclecticism resonates in certain strategic ways with contemporary lines of
thinking. Although the eclecticism of early modern Germany and that of
nineteenth-century France arose in different contexts, here, too, there are im-
portant similarities. Both varieties wanted to distance themselves from the main-
stream philosophy of their time—German eclectics fighting the influence of
Cartesianism, while France’s foremost eclectic, Cousin, was trying to super-
cede Hegel and Schelling.

The first to point out the importance of eclecticism in early modern Euro-
pean philosophy was Helmut Holzhey,1 and the most condensed account of the
whole “syndrome” was given by Horst Dreitze.2 We know now that eclecticism
was unjustly removed from the history of philosophy. In its past articula-
tion, mainly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, eclectic thinking com-
bined the claim for freedom of thought with the rejection of dogmatism and
sectarianism. Michael Albrecht shows with great diligence and with more than
abundant evidence that eclecticism is a genuine part of modern scientific and
philosophical thought, and any reader of Albrecht’s long list of eclectic think-
ers can have no doubt about the importance of the idea.

Over more than six hundred pages Albrecht divides his findings into forty-
eight chronological chapters. He tries not to comment on his subject, although
eclecticism quickly reveals itself as a tricky thing. Albrecht talks loosely about
“the idea of eclecticism,” “the eclectic thought,” “the Eclectic claim” because
he wants to keep the idea of eclecticism close to the literal sense of the word: in
Greek *ek-lergere* means selecting, or choosing. Broadly speaking, philosophical
eclecticism turns out to be in general just a claim. It was used by those who did
not want to be regarded as dogmatic, sectarian, or systematic thinkers. Albrecht
reports that claiming to be eclectic did in practice not amount to very much,
and indeed he notes (457) that no philosopher ever wrote an eclectic work.

Around 1600 Justus Lipsius and Jacopo Manzoni were among the very
first to advocate eclecticism openly, and here already Albrecht draws his gen-
eral conclusion: “Practically no author embracing eclecticism ... has made the
idea work” (382). This is especially true for philosophers in medicine and in
physics we know of Daniel Sennert and Johann Christoph Sturm who practiced
a method based on rational choice. Some American medical doctors in the
nineteenth century and some psychotherapists in the twentieth century (626-
60) also escape the historian’s criticism.

In the main part of his book Albrecht concentrates on eclectic thinking in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (144-605) and gives many citations

2 *Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart der ‘eklektischen’ Philosophie,” Zeitschrift für historische
In addition to the textual evidence there is, generally speaking, not much sense in distinguishing within eclecticism a more traditional attitude of linking one’s position to others and a more radical wish to be liberated from any authority. How could an educated choice be possible without being able to think for oneself? Albrecht himself knows that his distinction between eclecticism as reconstructive program and eclecticism as enlightened thinking does not hold (see 38). Still, he follows the interpretation outlined by historian of philosophy Werner Schneider, who identifies most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century eclectics with the Enlightenment.

Albrecht is searching for a positive image of eclecticism. However, the term eclecticism loses much of its significance when it is employed not as a key word in a certain set of sources but rather as a way of designating the author’s own conceptualization. This tendency can be seen also in Albrecht’s coining of the term “syncretism.” Syncretism is traditionally called a variation of eclecticism meaning the juxtaposition of thoughts of different origin, but Albrecht turns it into something conceptual saying that syncretism is the “holding together of dissenting opinions” (104), which he characterizes as an uncritical way of reconciling heterodox views. He finds syncretism, for example, in Petrarch’s Platonism or in less well known figures such as Johann Ludwig Hannemann (103, 378).

Albrecht uses syncretism as his own historiographic term applicable without respect for the language of the sources. However, his own evidence contradicts him here. Diderot once called somebody an eclectic whom he afterwards called a syncretist (565), while the church historian Johann Lorenz Mosheim identified both terms (506). Even Johann Christoph Sturm—who plays a major role in the history of eclecticism because he spread the term publicly in 1686 to designate his position in philosophy and in physics (both of which he taught at Altdorf University)—is ambivalent about the distinction and takes it as a relative one (333). Thus the sources do not provide the sort of clear distinction between eclecticism and syncretism which the author requires (108). Albrecht plainly dismisses the idea that eclecticism has something to do with “conciliation, peace, unification” (564), although only Budde and his pupil Stolle rejected “conciliation” as eclectic thinking. All other eclectics seem to acknowledge that selection cannot be done without some conciliation among philosophical opinions or between philosophical opinions and doctrines of the churches.

The concept of eclecticism which Albrecht tries to define against much of what he presents in his voluminous book is clearly close to a philosophical program. This is why he misses a strict definition of the term even in Sturm (322). The reader is left wondering whether such a definition of eclecticism can be given at all, since the sources yield no theoretical formulation. Instead they discuss “sects” and how to avoid being “sectarian” or “dogmatic.” Eclecticism is thus represented as a special way of philosophizing on the basis of the avoidance of dogmatism; it is a polemical idea, no program.

Another problem has to do with Albrecht’s ignoring of historical context. Only occasionally does he indicate the background of the fascination with eclecticism in Germany around 1700. He mentions the university situation in cities such as Halle, Leipzig, and Jena (485, 383), where it was mostly young men who favored eclecticism—“authors who had just started their career and did so by obliging to the spirit of the time in becoming, provisionally, so to speak, eclectic thinkers. Most of them later became theologians and never uttered the idea of eclecticism again, much like Budde after he was nominated professor of theology in 1705 at Jena University” (472). Regrettably, Albrecht does not follow this hint and does not consider the experimental nature of the eclectic claim more carefully. There is little doubt that eclecticism served as the ideal of intellectual freedom for those who had to make up their minds before starting a career within the philosophical or theological faculties. When Aristotelianism lost its function as a standard for university professors, when Cartesianism was still looming outside of the established institutions of teaching, this became precisely the hour of eclecticism. Eclecticism represented the middle way of “neither-not” stated positively as “as well as.” It seems to have been necessary in terms of the politics of knowledge at that moment of crisis (which Paul Hazard had described at length, without mentioning eclecticism4) to give a name to the third way. Eclecticism was that name, although it never defined, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a full-blown philosophical position.

What Albrecht’s voluminous evidence makes clear, is in the end nothing more and nothing less than the fascination with undogmatic thinking which accompanied modern philosophy. Eclecticism is part of the programmatic language modern European philosophy acquired then, and it is proof of the fact that modern philosophy never goes without any programmatic idea. Rejecting sectarianism does not in itself constitute a philosophical position. Albrecht seems to think that the idea of a “secta non secta” (an expression which was coined by the Bishop Liévin van der Beke in his commentary on Horace) is an “open door for freethinkers” (141). Actually this door was used very little, because although eclecticism may have been claimed and suggested successfully, it was rarely practiced methodically.

Eclecticism is not a doctrine but an intellectual attitude, and what its investigation requires is a closer look at the motivation of the authors. Albrecht attributes possible motives rather vaguely to “the spirit of the time,” to “what

was the air,” etc. (see 241, 302, 360, 472, 491n, 504f, 562). He ignores the vocabulary of the eclectics and the context in which they used their terms. Concepts like “sect” have to be carefully analyzed, if only to explain the paradoxical expressions of “secta electiva” or “secta non secta.” Other important terms of eclectic texts are “doubt,” “system,” “dogma,” “doctrine,” “freedom,” “truth,” or “evidence.” Such words constitute a language in which eclectic authors expressed their concerns and ideals, and if they have not developed a method or a system to carry through all philosophical problems, it is probably because they were more concerned with the possibilities of philosophy than with its traditional treatment. The texts which promoted eclecticism—university dissertations, prefaces, and other programmatic writings—support the view that eclecticism aimed at an overall summary of philosophy rather than at its transformation. It would be interesting to know what audiences the eclectic agenda reached outside certain circles in German universities, taking into account that widely known authors like Jean le Clerc and Denis Diderot valued eclecticism, although again we would have to provide specific contexts.

Albrecht’s study shows the importance of eclecticism in philosophy. Yet what he discovers is not so much an alternative philosophy as an alternative to philosophy, based on constructive, a-traditional, and progressive lines of thought. Kant once made the distinction between philosophy and philosophizing, and that is quite likely a distinction most eclectics also had in mind, except that they never possessed the analytical power which Kant unleashed with his “criticism.” The assault on dogmatism presented by the “Critique of Pure Reason” also swept aside the eclectic idea of non-dogmatic philosophies. At the end of the eighteenth century, eclecticism was indeed forgotten by Kant and his followers, at least in Germany. Here the university philosophers, traditionally inclined to the eclectic claim, turned to more systematic and encyclopaedic methods of inquiry.

In France in the nineteenth century it was a quite different story, with the extraordinary renaissance of eclecticism in the form of Victor Cousin’s philosophy. Cousin began the career with studies in the history of philosophy. He translated the entire corpus of Plato into French and published a twelve-volume edition of Descartes. He claimed very early to have overcome the many ways of “exclusive thinking” which he found to have prevailed in the eighteenth century. As a liberal he lost his teaching position at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1820, only to regain widespread public recognition in 1828 with a lecture series on the history of philosophy. For twenty years thereafter Cousin was an intellectual and political force in France. In 1830 he became a member of the “Conseil Royal de l’Instruction Publique”; then he

was made president of the “Jury d’Aggregation”; and in 1840 he took over the education ministry for eight months. Until the revolution of 1848 there was no philosopher in France teaching or researching whom Cousin had not personally supervised. The old and powerless Cousin wrote books on famous French women of the seventeenth century. He died in 1866 as an homme de lettres, widely criticized but recognized as a “classic French philosopher.”

Patrice Vermeren follows the wanderings of Cousin between philosophy, writing, politics, and erudition as an example of the intersections between philosophical thought and social engagement. He understands Cousin as a philosopher marginalized by German idealism and yet at the same time representing a national intelligentsia eager to take over the institutions of higher education. Vermeren is quite familiar with the context of Cousin’s career, having himself coedited two major textbooks on nineteenth-century philosophy.

Vermeren points out that the eclecticism of Cousin was from the outset politically oriented. It was a philosophy designed to influence public opinion and historical interpretation, and to govern national pedagogical institutions. How can we understand the Cousinian politics of philosophy entitled “eclecticism”? Vermeren offers the following three points. First, eclecticism declares itself to be the spirit of its time, heir to the enlightened belief in progress. Second, it aims at abolishing exclusive oppositions between the philosophies of idealism, sensualism, skepticism, and mysticism, which all flourished in the eighteenth century. Third, eclecticism proposes to promote the progress of thought out of the reconciliation of all past philosophy. These three claims have been widely discussed in Cousin’s time, for example even by Schelling and Hegel, although both these men, whom Cousin knew personally and with whom he regularly exchanged letters, were doubtful about Cousin’s capacity to live up to his third eclectic claim, that of general reconciliation.

Schelling was not convinced that Cousin had grasped the proper idea of his philosophy and warned his “très cher ami” in Paris not to tell his colleagues too much about it. Writing his last letter to Cousin in 1830, Hegel went further and wished Cousin had not spoken about his philosophy at all rather than distort it before a French public. Both reactions were due to the publication of Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques in 1826 and of the Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie in 1828.6

Cousin made it clear, however, that the history of philosophy would be established by himself, no matter what philosophers in other countries might say. A general reconciliation was necessary, he thought, because otherwise philosophy could not be taught or professed. This motivation behind eclecticism is what Vermeren sees as political: philosophy should serve the ends of teachers and liberal ideologists who do not want to take sides but prefer a "third" position, much like the impartial view of the historian. Cousin actually did a lot to further studies in the history of philosophy, both in schools and in the Parisian academies.

Cousin's politics of philosophy are apparent in rather small incidents: Vermeren tells many stories which illustrate the intellectual character of the philosopher, showing how, for example, Cousin found a patriotic way to cope with his imprisonment in Prussia, and how he eloquently refuted the criticism directed against him from German intellectuals and—much more dangerous for his educational projects—from French clergymen. The cultural and educational institutions introduced by Napoleon were openly debated in early nineteenth-century France, and Cousin worked out a statesman-like manner to enlist philosophy in the service of the nation, peace and freedom. He was the philosopher of the "juste-milieu" in both senses of the term (121), a philosopher who avoided the extreme and a member of the middle class which identified itself as the progressive part of bourgeois society.

Eclecticism is for Cousin something completely different from any other philosophical doctrine; it is a way of philosophizing, as Vermeren tries to show, which has its own language full of political implications, which celebrates the history of philosophy as the essence of the history of civilization, and which serves to restructure the educational system. With Cousin, a certain rhetoric of philosophy becomes part of its professional practice. The philosopher is viewed no more as "porteur du dogme" but as "fonctionnaire du concept" (156), so that a new aristocracy comes into being: the elite of the educated. Cousin's philosophy created in France what already existed in Prussia and Holland, that is, a class of civil servants. His activities both at the ministry of education and the Academy of moral and political sciences, together with his widely acclaimed public lectures, made Cousin a leading "intellectual" working on behalf of the sake of reason—which he equated, not unlike Hegel, with the State.

Vermeren's book is divided into two parts. The first—"La constitution de l'État enseignant" (35-195)—is devoted to "la naissance de l'eclecticisme et la production d'une tradition nationale." Here Cousin's involvement is analyzed on an intellectual as well as institutional level. The second part—"Les crises de l'institution philosophique française comme révélateurs des enjeux politiques dans l'État libéral moderne" (197-336)—deals with the adversaries of Cousin, representing the establishment. Vermeren shows that not only attacks on the educational system but also a return to science and the rise of a new popular philosophy made Cousin lose power, philosophically and politically, even if disciples such as Jules Simon and Jules Barthélémy-Saint-Hilaire kept up his memory.

What becomes clear in retrospect is that philosophical eclecticism—later rebaptized spiritualism by Cousin himself—was a name for an intellectual strategy. Judged philosophically, this strategy was wrong from the outset in that it was not able to show convincingly how philosophers like Schelling, Hegel, Thomas Reid, or Maine de Biran, to name just a few from whom Cousin said he had learned, could be "reconciled." The whole idea of outlining the history of philosophy as the progress of humanity was little more than what Condorcet did at the end of the eighteenth century, and it was no less fantastic.

However, if eclecticism cannot be esteemed as a philosophy, it can still be understood contextually, by linking its very claims to the intellectual needs and the political conflicts of the time. This is what Vermeren does successfully precisely by not avoiding consideration of Cousin's many struggles and fights. German Hegelians were content with refuting the theoretical meaning in the term eclecticism. But the political meaning is more apparent, and this suggests the value of broadening the history of philosophy beyond merely intellectual disciplines. Cousin is largely forgotten today because his maneuvers and manipulations as a philosopher were almost inextricable from the educational and national politics of his time. So books on the history of philosophy tend to recall him only as an editor of Plato and Descartes.

A curious effect of this nineteenth-century interest in the history of philosophy is that it forgets its own initiators, simply because they were no "great" philosophers themselves. As Vermeren shows convincingly, there is a way to remedy this memory lapse. We may reconsider past philosophers as intellectuals by investigating their social involvement, their political conflicts, and their theoretical aims on a strategic level, and relate their thinking to the working of the institutions of their time.

What do we learn from all this research about eclecticism? Is it an idea we could take on today? Some philosophers indeed cherish the idea of giving up the systematic pretensions great thinkers once had. There is a pragmatist dislike of philosophy with a capital "P," as Richard Rorty put it, and there is a postmodern inclination to try what Gianni Vattimo calls "weak thinking." In the midst of this revision of canonical philosophy one would not be astonished to find a certain degree of sympathy for eclectic thinking. In any case, the historical investigations into the claims and contexts of eclecticism show that in order to accept eclecticism we have to rethink the history of philosophy.

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11 See the footnotes in Victor Cousin über französische und deutsche Philosophie, aus dem Französischen von Hubert Beckers, nebst einer beurteilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimrats von Schelling, ed. and tr. Hubert Beckers (Stuttgart, 1834).
There is no point in "rediscovering" eclecticism as an older alternative to systematic philosophy if we do not at the same time reconstruct the way philosophy is represented by our cultural memory. As long as we fancy philosophy as some sort of literature we may hunt for the greatest authors; but the more we see philosophy itself involved in social and political life, philosophy becomes a set of thoughts related much more intimately to education, arts, science, culture, and politics. It is by adjusting our historical imagination to the more common levels of intellectual life that we may learn to understand philosophy in a concrete way which also leads us to rediscover, and reconsider, eclecticism.

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Notices

The Department of Philosophy of the College of the Holy Cross announces a symposium, "Kant's Legacy—A Symposium in Honor of Lewis White Beck" (1-2 May 1998, at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts). The participants are Henry Allison (Boston University), Robert Holmes (University of Rochester), Joseph Lawrence (College of the Holy Cross), Ralf Meerbergen (University of Rochester), Gerold Plass (Albert-Ludwig-Universität Freiburg), Stanley Rosen (Boston University) Robert P. Wolff (University of Massachusetts-Amherst), and Allen Wood (Yale University). Contact Professor Predrag Cicovacki, Department of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA 01610; phone (508) 793-2467; fax: (508) 793-3030; e-mail: pcicovacki@holycross.edu.

Conferences: 1. The 13th Annual Siena College Symposium, Multi-disciplinary World War II—A Dual Perspective The 60th Anniversary—Preliminaries The 50th Anniversary—Aftermath will be held 4-5 June 1998. Focus on 1938, World War II Beginnings: Topics include Fascism and Nazism, Spain, Austria, Munich, Literature, Art, Film, Women's Studies, and Jewish Studies. 2. Theodore Roosevelt and the Dawn of the "American Century" will be held 18-19 April 1998. Contact Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY 12211-1462; tel.: (518) 783-2595; fax: (518) 786-5052; e-mail: kelly@siena.edu.


Call for papers: "Bosanquet and the Legacy of British Idealism" (1-2 September 1999), Harris Manchester College, Oxford, in association with the British Society for the History of Philosophy and the Bradley Society. Proposals for papers due 1 October 1998, papers due 15 December 1998. Contact Professor William Sweet, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia B2G 2W5. Canada. Tel.: 1 902 867 2341; fax 1 902 867 3243; e-mail: wsweet@sfu.ca.

Colin and Ailta Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize Competition: Papers on Berkeley’s theory of vision (5000 words) due 1 November 1998. The winner will be announced 1 March 1999 and will receive a prize of $2,000. Send essays to: Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P. O. Box 270078, Latimer 532, Rochester, NY 14627-0078.