DIPLOMARBEIT

zum Thema

Moral Disengagement in media and Moral Identity activation: their interactive effect on support of war

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V. ABSTRACT

People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms. These mechanisms within media have a positive effect on immoral behaviour. However, Moral Identity activation is said to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement. In this study, both concepts are applied to the context of war. An additional assumption took into account in how far participants’ internalized moral standards consider war as immoral. This is important since Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement are based on internalized moral standards.

To test the hypotheses, this study employed a 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design. The trait variable called Moral Consideration of War was supposed to reflect participants’ internalized moral standards with regard to war. It was used to operationalize the additional assumption. Factor 1 varied the activation of Moral Identity (Moral Identity activation versus control group) and factor 2 varied the depiction of the war scenario (Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). Scenarios were fictive newspaper articles. A Permissive Scenario comprised a higher number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms than a Prohibitive Scenario. Main outcome measures were the support of war and war-related Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). In total 86 participants (f=45, m=41) were randomized into four cells and completed the online experiment.

The Permissive Scenario failed to increase support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the assumption that war is considered immoral. Moral Identity activation had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement only on the assumption that war was considered moral. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war, on the premise that war was considered immoral. The interaction term of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had no significant effect neither on support of war nor on Moral Disengagement, no matter if additional assumption was taken into account or not.

Results are discussed with regard to methodological limitations measuring internalized moral standards. Their measurement implied already individual Moral Disengagement. Interaction effect failed, supposedly because Moral Identity activation was not specifically targeted at immoral behaviour and because mediating effects of Moral Identity centrality were not considered.
VI. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG


Die Ergebnisse werden in Bezug auf die methodischen Probleme bei der Messung internalisierter moralischer Standards diskutiert. Es fanden vermutlich Prozesse der Moralischen Entkopplung bereits während der Messung dieser Standards statt. Der fehlende Interaktionseffekt kann an der schwachen und unspezifischen Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität liegen, sowie nicht berücksichtigter Mediatoren, wie z.B. die Zentralität von Moralischer Identität.
1 INTRODUCTION

War is a cruel endeavour: the public record of violent deaths following the 2003 invasion of Iraq documented more than 120 000 civilian deaths from war-related violence (IBC, 2003-2014). However, the knowledge of those numbers does not automatically lead to a complete rejection of war. Instead, people are appealed to war on certain conditions, e.g. if those numbers are compared against even more severe consequences. When war is inherently connected to death and devastation, why do politicians, soldiers and ordinary citizens support military interventions in other countries? The second central questions for this research is about which factors could possibly diminish support of war?

Psychology tries to answer these questions with different approaches. For the first question a concept called Moral Disengagement will be focused. This concept refers to a situation where a person maintains a positive view of his or her moral self even when engaging in immoral behaviour (Bandura, 1999; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006). With different Moral Disengagement mechanisms a person can reconstruct the reality of war: by distracting from negative consequences, by emphasizing the moral obligation to prevent genocide, by calling victims of the war inhumane terrorists and by displacing responsibility of the actions to higher authorities. Thereby news media have a decisive impact on this reconstruction of reality because media comprise arguments similar to Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 2002). This study will explain how Moral Disengagement within media increases individual support of war.

Regarding the second question about factors that could diminish support of war, the psychological concept of Moral Identity holds valuable answers (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007). If Moral Identity is activated, a person is more attentive to his or her moral behaviour and maintenance of a positive view on his or her moral self. Therefore, the person does not easily employ abovementioned mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and is consequently less prone to support war. It will be investigated in this study if Moral Identity activation counters the effect of Moral Disengagement in media, too.

The concepts of Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity are proposed to be two sides of the same coin. Moral Disengagement is supposed to increase support of war, whereby Moral Identity counteracts Moral Disengagement. These theoretical considerations will be challenged experimentally. This study probes the concept of Moral Identity. Does its activation reduce the effect of Moral Disengagement in media? Further, this study seeks to
contribute to answering in how far Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media actually change people’s support for military interventions and war. Answers to those questions would be valuable for journalists and bloggers especially when considering how often military interventions were part of the public discourse in the last years.
2 THEORY

The two key questions for this research are: a) why people support immoral behaviour? b) Which factors could possibly diminish this support? The theory is divided in five main sections. The first two sections target the first key question. It will be explained how Moral Disengagement increases immoral behaviour and more specifically support of war (2.1). The next section (2.2) concentrates on Moral Disengagement in media and proposes that media are likely to employ arguments similar to Moral Disengagement when covering topics of war. The third section (2.3) gives an insight into Moral Identity and its activation targeting the second key question. It will be explained how Moral Identity counteracts Moral Disengagement and thus reduces immoral behaviour and the support of war. The fourth section (2.4) sums up theoretical considerations deducting the hypotheses for this study. The fifth and last section (2.5) of this chapter explains reasons for this study.

2.1 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT

The main hypothesis of this section is that Moral Disengagement increases immoral behaviour. The rationale behind this prediction is based on Bandura’s (1999) Socio Cognitive Theory of Morality. Therefore, this theory and Moral Disengagement mechanisms will be explained in the following two subsections (2.1.1 and 2.1.2). The third subsection (2.1.3) will link Moral Disengagement to the support of war.

2.1.1 SOCIO COGNITIVE THEORY OF MORALITY

According to Bandura (1999) and his theoretical considerations, morality is embedded in a broader “socio cognitive self-theory” (p.193) and guides behaviour: while early in life morality is dictated by external agents, e.g. parents and relatives, it is later internalized through socialization and cognitive processes (Bandura & McDonald, 1963). After internalization morality constitutes a self-regulatory, self-reflective and proactive process, guiding and self-sanctioning behaviour. People monitor their behaviour and anticipate external (social environment) or internal reward and punishment. Cognitive dissonance and hence distress, shame and guilt arise when actual behaviour does not align with internalized moral standards and beliefs. An example for this may be a situation where a person supports a war though he or she always has been pacifist (Festinger, 1962). Behaving in line with internalized moral standards through self-regulation of behaviour and sanctioning avoids distress caused by cognitive dissonance and produces feelings of self-worth instead (Bandura, 1991, 1999). Nevertheless, self-regulation and sanctioning processes may be prevented by
Moral Disengagement: people can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour and at the same time alleviate cognitive dissonance, shame and guilt (Bandura, 1999; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008).

Bandura (1991, 1999) suggests that it depends on an implicit cost-benefit-analysis, whether it would be more costly to act morally (self-sanctioning and self-regulation) or to disengage from one’s internalized moral standard (Moral Disengagement) in the pursuit of personal goals.

2.1.2 MECHANISMS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT

People may disengage from internal moral standards and thus from immoral behaviour through six different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 1999): a) reconstruction of the situation involving the immoral behaviour (= moral justification); b) making a bad thing look good and downgrading possible negative consequences (= advantageous comparison); c) using euphemistic language (euphemistic wording); d) play down one’s own involvement (= diffusion of responsibility); e) displace one’s responsibility; f) devaluate the victims of the action (= dehumanization and attribution of blame). These mechanisms act in concert. They modify beliefs and reduce cognitive dissonance (Bandura, 1999).

In a first cross-sectional study (N=799), Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, Pastorelli and Concetta (1996) have shown the positive relationship between Moral Disengagement and aggressive behaviour of kids in high school and elementary school. In order to measure the different Moral Disengagement mechanisms, Bandura et al. (1996) developed the Moral Disengagement Scale. Study participants scoring high on the Moral Disengagement scale were also more aggressive. Aggressive kids employed the Moral Disengagement mechanisms more often. Bandura et al. (1996) conclude that people who use Moral Disengagement mechanisms, disengage from internalized moral standards and self-regulative behaviour. They are able to conduct immoral behaviour by cognitive reconstruction (Bandura et al., 1996).

The positive relationship between immoral behaviour and Moral Disengagement has been demonstrated in many studies with different contexts (Bandura, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandström, Udd, & Morrison, 2002). Moral Disengagement was transferred to the domain of war, too (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).
2.1.3 **Moral Disengagement and War**

War is a situation where Moral Disengagement is likely to happen by its supporters and also by soldiers (Aquino et al., 2007; Grossman, 1995). Warfare most of the time involves human suffering and deaths not only of combatants, but also of innocent civilians. This is why negative feelings are often intuitively associated with war and war supporters have to justify their standpoint.\(^1\) Bandura (1999) hypothesises that a radical change from e.g. a pacifist mind into a supporter for military action does not involve the rapid alteration of the personality structure or an increase of aggressiveness. It rather involves a “re-defini[tion of] the morality” (p.195) of military action involving abovementioned Moral Disengagement mechanisms (McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006). These mechanisms will be explained more detailed in the following.

a) **Moral Justification**

This mechanism serves the cognitive reconstruction of the harmful behaviour, portraying it as serving socially acceptable and worthy or moral ends. Thus, the harmful behaviour transforms to a moral imperative. One example may be *human rights violations that can be stopped by military means* (Bandura, 1999). Instead of pointing out that a military intervention causes harm and suffer, positive and morally acceptable results are underlined. A positive result of a military intervention such as prevention of human rights violations would be then a way to legitimize immoral behaviour.

b) **Advantageous Comparison**

This is a mechanism of making a bad thing look good simply by comparing it to a greater evil. This contrasting principle often relies on utilitarian standards and helps to reduce the harmfulness of one’s own behaviour (Bandura, 1999). For instance, if a *military intervention is likely to kill only 1000 opponent soldiers, but can prevent a genocide of millions* instead. This example implies that a genocide will happen (greater evil) if there is no military intervention. Possible negative consequences can be distorted, minimized or simply ignored in order to serve an advantageous comparison. In the example the possibility of civilian casualties is ignored. Further, the word *only* implies a distortion and reduction of the value of a human life.

c) **Euphemistic Wording**

\(^1\) There is, however, the possibility that a person associates positive thoughts and feelings with war depending on whether these different standards were internalized through socialization. This will be addressed below.
This mechanism distorts the truth of an action through wording. Different words with the same meaning may appear less harmful, more respectable and positively or negatively connotated. Sanitizing language camouflages the actual intention or meaning of an action (Bandura, 1999). An example would be to describe a war as a *quick and harmless rescue operation with little collateral damage*. In this study euphemistic wording is present, too. E.g. because the word *military intervention* and the word *war* are used interchangeably. Even though it is arguable if those two terms mean precisely the same, they do suggest two different connotations (more positive = military intervention, more negative = war).

d) Diffusion of Responsibility

This mechanism proposes that moral control is weakened through the diffusion of accountability when different parties or people work on one higher goal. Due to the subdivision of labour, individuals concentrate on the moral worth of their own work which is considered seemingly less harmless than the whole operation. One example would be that *my own country is anyway only one of many others that carry out the military intervention. Plus my country provides only non-military support*. Diffusion of responsibility is found in group decision making, too. In a group nobody really feels responsible and accountability may be attributed to the other group members (Bandura, 1999; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Zimbardo, 1969).

e) Displacement of Responsibility

Displacement of responsibility means that people are not the actual agent of the immoral behaviour because order came from a superior legitimate authority. The Milgram experiments show that in case an authority takes over full responsibility for one’s action that aggressiveness and harmful behaviour increase (Bandura, 1999; Milgram, 1975). A political equivalent would be that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approves a military intervention by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. In this example responsibility is delegated to the UNSC and diffused by the amount of NATO members (diffusion of responsibility).

f) Dehumanization and Attribution of Blame

This mechanism relies on how people view the victims of the immoral behaviour. Self-censure and regulation of conduct are reduced when victims are denied human qualities. When another person is not viewed human and devaluated to a savage, without feelings, thoughts and hope, there is no need to treat him like a human (Bandura, 1999). This is
because a ‘non-human’ will not be able to feel the maltreatment (Bandura et al., 1975). An example is that victims of a military intervention are depicted as ruthless followers of the dictator and ‘inhuman’ terrorists. Further, blame can be attributed to the victim. It is more likely that a “non-human” deserved the maltreatment (Bierhoff, 2002). The consequence are feelings “[…] of self-righteousness and justification on the side of the perpetrator” (p.4, Jackson, 2005). On the other hand humanization is a powerful way to withhold people from cruel action (Bandura et al., 1975). In the Milgram experiments, participants refused from inflicting pain upon others through direct personal action rather than remotely done (Bandura, 1999; Milgram, 1975).

Moral Disengagement mechanisms in the context of war and the support of war found evidence in a study by McAlister et al. (2006) and a study by Aquino et al. (2007). These studies will be explained in the following.

McAlister et al. (2006) conducted a study (N=1499) with two randomly selected samples before (N=1000) and after 11th September 2001 (N=499). The two samples were comparable with regard to gender, race and age. Participants were supposed to evaluate items derived from abovementioned Moral Disengagement mechanisms, for instance: military force is legitimate when diplomacy and negotiations drag on without resolving conflict (= moral justification) or terrorists do not deserve to be treated like human beings (= dehumanization). The support of immoral behaviour was operationalized with the support of war, more precisely the support of military campaigns in Iraq after the attacks against the World Trade Centre. Comparing the two samples before and after the attacks, McAlister et al. (2006) observed that Moral Disengagement scores mediated the support for military campaigns.

Support of immoral behaviour (support of war) and Moral Disengagement correlated positively. McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show that Moral Disengagement does not only apply to one’s own immoral behaviour, but also to the support of immoral behaviour (support of war).

Study 1 by Aquino et al. (2007) found similar findings. University participants (N=104) were asked about personality variables such as Moral Identity centrality as well as Moral Disengagement (time 1). Three months later, judgments of punitive responses to the 9/11 attacks were recorded for the same participants (time 2). Results show a positive relationship between Moral Disengagement and highly punitive responses against 9/11 attackers.
Both studies state a positive relationship between Moral Disengagement and support of immoral behaviour related to war. However, these two studies include an implicit assumption regarding Moral Disengagement and the support of war. For Moral Disengagement to happen it is theoretically necessary that the behaviour is actually judged immoral by a person, too. In the case of war, internalized moral standards would need to condemn war. Otherwise this person would not have to disengage from self-regulation and internalized moral standards. He or she would then be a person who generally associates positive feelings, attitudes and thoughts with war. Examples from history and today illustrate the possibility that cultures, societies and groups can indeed be different regarding internalized moral standards. In heroic fighting cultures and war cultures of armies (e.g. Spartan army) or criminal gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha and Los Zetas, violence and war have a different connotation when serving the well-being of the group or an ideology (Staub, 1992). Accordingly, this study will include an additional assumption in the hypotheses and statistical analysis. It is about what is considered moral and immoral. Moral Disengagement in the context of war occurs only if war is generally judged immoral. The additional assumption refers to internalized moral standards operationalized by using a Moral Consideration of War scale (see subsection 3.2.1.1).

In summary, it was explained on a theoretical level how different Moral Disengagement mechanisms within a person justify the support of immoral behaviour. These mechanisms disengage the self from internalized moral standards and self-regulation. Empirical research has shown that Moral Disengagement occurs when people support war (Aquino et al., 2007; McAlister et al., 2006) implying that internalized moral standards refer to war as something immoral. Otherwise there would be no need to disengage.

In the abovementioned studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and McAlister et al. (2006), Moral Disengagement with regard to war is measured by a questionnaire. How could Moral Disengagement be varied experimentally so that its causal effect on immoral behaviour (support of war) can be tested? A possible answer lies in mass media which are an important information source influencing people’s behaviour and opinions (Bandura, 2002). Therefore, the next section will look at Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media to see its effects on immoral behaviour and the support of war.

2.2 Moral Disengagement and Media

Personal opinions and behaviour are influenced by everyday exposure to mass media (Bandura, 2002). One obvious example would be how commercials are highly influencing
people’s consumption behaviour (see for instance Vakratsas & Ambler, 1999). The main hypothesis of this section is that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media can foster immoral behaviour (support of war), too. The rationale for this prediction will be explained in the following: the first goal is to examine how media influence aggressive behaviour with the help of Moral Disengagement mechanisms (subsection 2.2.1). The second goal is to suggest a relationship between Moral Disengagement in media on the one hand and war on the other by introducing the Theory of Just War (subsection 2.2.2). The third goal is to show how Moral Disengagement can be varied experimentally in newspaper articles about war (subsection 2.2.3).

2.2.1 Moral Disengagement in Media and Aggressive Behaviour

Moral Disengagement in mass media can trigger immoral behaviour due to observational learning and persuasion (Bandura, 2002; Berkowitz, 1984). There has been research in which the different Moral Disengagement mechanisms are systematically varied in media portrayals of inhumanities (Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). When the viewer is exposed to media that morally justifies harmful behaviour, blames and dehumanizes victims, displaces or diffuses personal responsibility and misconstrues negative consequences, then the viewer’s immoral behaviour increases likewise. In other words the viewer’s immoral behaviour has been released due to the Moral Disengagement mechanisms within the media (Bandura, 2002). Empirical evidence comes from older studies on media and aggressive behaviour. One study by Meyer (1972) will be explained in the following.

Meyer (1972) randomized university students (N=200) into different groups. All participants watched a real video depicting violent acts of South Vietnamese against North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. Groups heard different voice tracks of the video, either justifying or not justifying the violent acts. Justification included the dehumanization of the victim, too. Dependent measures were the number and intensity of electro shocks returned to an accomplice’s composition. Results of the study show that the group watching the justified violence video returned more intensive shocks and shocked more often the accomplice than the group watching the not justified violence video (Meyer, 1972). Meyer (1972) explains that moral justification on the voice tracks had a reinforcing effect on participants’ subsequent aggressive behaviour. Reinforcement increases the likelihood that the behaviour will occur again. Participants observed that violent behaviour was not punished and conducted violent behaviour themselves. This is observational learning: when other aggressive behaviour is
rewarded through justification and absence of punishment, then the probability of subsequent personal aggression is increased (Bandura et al., 1975).

Other studies e.g. by Berkowitz and Rawlings (1963) observed similar results regarding dehumanization of victims of violence and aggression in media (cf. Berkowitz, 1984). Explanations emphasize the perceived justification of violence by putting a situation in a good or a bad light to the audience. This can also be done by leaving out certain information or by emphasizing information differently (cf. Cohrs, 2008; Druckman, 2004).

To sum up, there is evidence that some Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media increase audience’s aggressive behaviour (Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). In other words and more generally speaking, Moral Disengagement within media has a positive effect on subsequent immoral behaviour. The mechanism behind this effect is the reinforcing effect of justified immoral behaviour in the media. In the following, it is proposed that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media can be transferred to the domain of war, too.

2.2.2 Moral Disengagement in Media and War

War may appear more or less justified in media and there is a proposed relationship to Moral Disengagement mechanisms.

It was described in subsection 2.2.2 how the usage of Moral Disengagement mechanisms serves to support war-related immoral behaviour. Moral Disengagement mechanisms justify war through the rational-cognitive reconstruction of the situation (Bandura, 2001; Bandura et al., 1996; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997): for instance when war serves to promote peace or to prevent suffering and when peaceful means of conflict resolution are unsuccessful (= moral justification + advantageous comparison). Further, if a given member of a group, e.g. a soldier, cannot be held accountable for group decisions, then killing appears more legitimate (= diffusion of responsibility; compare to items of war-related Moral Disengagement scale by McAlister, 2001 and Terrorism Questionnaire by Jackson, 2005; Table 9).

In a study by Cohrs (2008) Moral Disengagement mechanisms were experimentally varied in descriptions of the Kosovo War (N=275). Dependent variable was the attitude to the Kosovo War after reading the descriptions. Results show a positive effect of Moral Disengagement mechanisms within the description of the war on subsequent war attitudes (Cohrs, 2008).

The study by Cohrs (2008) shows that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within descriptions of war have a positive effect on the support of war, but are Moral Disengagement mechanisms present in news media covering war-related topics? Support derives from parallels to political
theory. On a national level it is arguable if Moral Disengagement plays much of a role. The reasons for one nation to go to war against another are manifold and legitimization is more likely to be derived from international law and political considerations. Just War Theory is a political theory developed by Roman and Catholic philosophers and sets standards for the questions of war and peace in international humanitarian law (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). The theory defines several criteria for a *jus ad bellum*, i.e. the right to war: 1) The war must be based on a right cause, e.g. severe human rights violations happening in a country; 2) right intention, meaning that the true intention lies in the establishment of peace or the prevention of severe evil; 3) proportionality of the means employed, meaning that the positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones; 4) authorized by legitimate authority, e.g. the UN Security Council; 5) ultima ratio, meaning that other non-military remedies fail success; and 6) probability of success of for instance subsequent peace agreements (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Moseley, 2009).

Parallels with regard to contents appear between the political and psychological theories comparing Moral Disengagement mechanisms to Just War Theory criteria (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Comparison between Moral Disengagement Mechanisms and Just War Theory Criteria, Examples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Disengagement Mechanisms</th>
<th>Just War Theory Criteria</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Justification</td>
<td>Right cause</td>
<td>Prevent Human Rights violations, e.g. Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right intention</td>
<td>Intervening countries are only interested in the right cause (no power or economic interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantageous Comparison</td>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>Genocide is preventable with military force causing little damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ultima ratio</td>
<td>non-military remedies, e.g. economic sanctions and negotiations, fail success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion + Displacement of Responsibility</td>
<td>Legitimization</td>
<td>UNSC approves military intervention by NATO forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downgrading, Ignoring or Misconstruing Negative Consequences</td>
<td>Probability of Success</td>
<td>High likelihood of post-war peace and prosperity; only few potential casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euphemistic Wording</td>
<td>Probability of Success</td>
<td>High likelihood of post-war peace and prosperity; only few potential casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This is differing between the types of news media, e.g.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dehumanization tabloid vs. high quality and does not address the content of a text or argumentation, but How something is represented. For example the word “tribe” can be considered something less human and ancient than the word “group” (Arndt, Hornscheidt, & Bauer, 2004). Because of this and because there is no counterpart in Just War Theory criteria, those two mechanisms will not be varied.

One parallel is explained in the following example: a military intervention is said to be the only way to prevent further human rights violations. Moral justification as one Moral Disengagement mechanism is given because the military intervention serves a moral worthy end. In terms of Just War Theory criteria, the same point equals the right cause (see Table 1). Looking further at Table 1, certain overlaps between the two theories are obvious except for euphemistic wording and dehumanization.

The parallels suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms do not only apply for the justification of immoral behaviour and the support of war on an individual level, but partly for the legitimization of war on a national level, too. Therefore, it is plausible that news media comprise argumentation in line with Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Just War Theory criteria when covering topics of war. Hence, different scenarios with regard to the permissiveness of a war can be operationalized with a better external validity in this study. Arguments within the scenarios would not only be based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms but also on Theory of Just War criteria.

2.2.3 Operationalization of Scenarios

In this study two newspaper articles about a fictive war scenario will be constructed. The article appears more permissive regarding the support of war if it comprises many arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive Scenario). The article is prohibitive when only few of these arguments are given (Prohibitive Scenario). The permissiveness of the newspaper articles should affect reader’s support of war: firstly, because justification in media has a reinforcing effect on the audience’s support of war (see subsection 2.2.1; Bandura et al., 1975; Cohrs, 2008; Meyer, 1972). Secondly, it is proposed that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media trigger personal Moral Disengagement preventing self-regulation and releasing from internalized moral standards. The cognitive reconstruction of the war increases support of war.
The Permissive Scenario should foster the recipient’s support of war because arguments prevent individual self-regulation and release from internalized moral standards. The reason for this is that Moral Disengagement in the Permissive Scenario triggers Moral Disengagement within a person. At the same time the justification of war in the Permissive Scenario functions as a positive reinforcement for support of war. This mechanism is proposed to be similar to observational learning and aggressive behaviour watching justified and unjustified violent films (see subsection 2.2.1; Bandura et al., 1975; Meyer, 1972).

The Prohibitive Scenario instead should decrease recipient’s support of war because self-regulation is not prevented and internalized moral standards are not disengaged from by arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. At the same time positive reinforcement of justification of war is weaker when reading the Prohibitive Scenario.

However, the aforementioned additional assumption needs to be considered, too, because it is possible that a person reacts differently to the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario. Reactions depend on a person’s internalized moral standards. A person should consider war as something immoral. Otherwise arguments (based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria) would not lead to an increased support of war by the reader of the scenario.

In summary, it was described how Moral Disengagement is used in media increasing aggressive behaviour (Meyer, 1972). Further, the parallels between Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria were explained supporting the idea that Moral Disengagement in media can be transferred to the domain of war, too. It was hypothesized that many arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in media (Permissive Scenario) have a positive effect on a person’s support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).

The next section will look at how Moral Disengagement can be prevented or reduced. It is hypothesized that Moral Identity activation can work as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement.

### 2.3 Moral Identity

The main hypothesis for this section is that Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement reducing immoral behaviour. This prediction derives from the concept of Moral Identity based on the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino,
Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps (2009): first, Moral Identity is a stable personality characteristic called centrality of Moral Identity. Second, Moral Identity can be activated by situational cues. Third, this model assumes that Moral Disengagement interacts with Moral Identity influencing immoral behaviour. The three premises of the Model will be looked at more closely in the following subsections.

2.3.1 **Moral Identity Centrality**

Moral Identity is the cornerstone of the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour. It is defined by Aquino et al. (2009, p.124) as a “cognitive schema a person holds about his or her moral character”, stored in memory as “a complex knowledge structure”. This knowledge structure consists of internalized moral standards, “goals, traits, and behavioural scripts”. The knowledge structure is acquired through life experiences (socialization) which are different from person to person. This is why Moral Identity can be of more or less centrality within a person and differing in its centrality between people (Blasi, 1984). Aquino et al. (2009) describe Moral Identity centrality as a stable personality variable. High Moral Identity centrality, for instance, exerts greater influence on behaviour and processes that guide behaviour because Moral Identity related traits are better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009).

In the 6th study, Aquino and Reed (2002) investigated the relation of Moral Identity centrality to actual moral behaviour. First, 145 university participants were asked to fill out a prior version of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003). This explicit 10-item questionnaire measures Moral Identity centrality in an internalization and symbolization subscale. Subscales refer to the point that Moral Identity comprises a private (internalization) and public (symbolization) dimension. Three months later, participants were given the opportunity to engage in food donations. Results showed that the internalization dimension, i.e. Moral Identity centrality, is positively correlated with the donation.

The explanation for this finding goes back to abovementioned interpersonal differences in Moral Identity centrality and the accessibility of internalized moral standards and traits (knowledge structures). Aquino and Reed (2002, p.1424) say that internalized moral standards and “moral traits form part of a network of connected components”. Based on the learning principle ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’, higher Moral Identity centrality means that the moral self-schema (Moral Identity) is activated more easily, more strongly and more frequently (Aquino et al., 2009). This higher activation potential (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) results from learning, i.e. frequent priming or personality variables acquired during socialization, and inherited personality traits (Aquino et al., 2009; Higgins, 1996).
increased activation potential makes Moral Identity more important for the self and is thus better accessible exerting greater influence on cognition and moral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). With regard to the study by Aquino and Reed (2002) it is to say that participants with a high Moral Identity centrality have better access to their Moral Identity, in other words to donation and helping related knowledge structures. They learned through socialization that helping and donating is valuable and important for the self-definition. As a result they engaged in food donations to a greater extent than participants with a lower Moral Identity centrality.

In summary, there is evidence that higher Moral Identity centrality has a positive effect on moral behaviour due to the increased accessibility of internalized moral standards and traits. Aquino and Reed (2002) proposed that Moral Identity may be externally activated, too, and interact with Moral Disengagement reducing immoral behaviour.

2.3.2 Moral Identity Activation and Moral Disengagement

Moral Identity can be activated by identity-invoking stimuli (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Aquino and Reed (2002) used inductive qualitative methods to find trait-related adjectives that could function as situational cues for the activation of Moral Identity. The following adjectives were found: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest and kind. These adjectives can be used to activate Moral Identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007). Aquino and Reed (2002) assumed that not all possible traits constituting Moral Identity need to be activated by situational cues, but that the activation of a subset linked to other moral traits is sufficient to activate Moral Identity as a whole. Aquino et al. (2009) demonstrated that Moral Identity activation with abovementioned adjectives raises Moral Identity centrality especially for people who are scoring low on their Moral Identity centrality. The effect of Moral Identity activation on cognition and moral behaviour works similar to the trait variable of high Moral Identity centrality (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007). This is a major point of the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino et al. (2009): the activation of mental representations of the moral self (Moral Identity) is important for processing social information and the guidance of behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001).

The following studies demonstrate first that Moral Identity can be activated by trait-related adjectives and second that Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement influencing war-related immoral behaviour. Afterwards, theoretical explanations will be provided.
2.3.2.1 Empirical Support for Moral Identity Activation and Moral Disengagement

In an experimental study by Aquino et al. (2007), participants were randomly assigned either to a Moral Identity activation prime condition or a non-Moral Identity activation prime condition (study 1). Priming was done with abovementioned trait-related adjectives. Participants had to read the adjectives and were asked to associate them with personal experiences in a handwriting task. A control group was primed with more neutral adjectives. Dependent variables were negative emotional responses to the cruel behaviour of US soldiers. Additional measure was advantageous comparison as one Moral Disengagement mechanism. Even though manipulation check suggested success of priming procedure, Moral Identity activation had no direct effect on the experience of negative emotions. Moral Disengagement decreased the experience of negative emotions. However, interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Disengagement increased the experience of negative emotions. In other words, Moral Identity activation neutralized the effect of Moral Disengagement on the outcome measure. This study supports the idea that on the on hand Moral Identity can be activated by identity-invoking stimuli and on the other that Moral Identity activation counters Moral Disengagement.

Evidence for a similar interaction effect (Moral Disengagement x Moral Identity centrality) comes further from a second study by Aquino et al. (2007). As described in subsection 2.1.3 already, university participants (N=104) were asked about personality variables such as Moral Identity centrality as well as Moral Disengagement (time 1). Three months later judgments of punitive responses to the 9/11 attacks were recorded for the same participants (time 2). As a result interaction effects of Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity centrality show a negative relationship on punitive responses. While Moral Disengagement was positively related to punitive responses for low moral identifiers, there was no relationship between these variables for high moral identifiers. Aquino et al. (2007) say that this result provides empirical evidence for the idea that Moral Identity centrality neutralizes the effects of Moral Disengagement allowing people to support war-related immoral behaviour.

2.3.2.2 Explanations for the Interactive Effects of Moral Identity Activation and Moral Disengagement

Aquino et al. (2007) explain the study results with an increased circle of moral regard due to prior Moral Identity activation (study 1) or the high Moral Identity centrality (study 2): Aquino et al. (2007) and Reed and Aquino (2003) say that people routinely establish group boundaries, i.e. a circle of moral regard (Singer, 1981; Staub, 1992). A person feels stronger
moral obligation to people within these boundaries (e.g. friends, family or people of the same nationality). If Moral Identity is activated or if Moral Identity centrality is high, knowledge structures comprising internalized moral standards, traits, goals and behavioural scripts are cognitively better accessible. As a result circle of moral regard is more likely to be expanded and people take into account the suffering of those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater extent (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Youniss & Yates, 1999). Consequently, the circle of moral regard expansion reduces Moral Disengagement, because the others are humanized inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). Humanization prevents dehumanization which is one Moral Disengagement mechanism (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 1975). Additionally, humanization should affect different Moral Disengagement mechanisms at the same time because moral justification, advantageous comparison and others are less necessary when an enemy is humanized, i.e. considered inside the circle of moral regard. This explanation was derived from theoretical considerations by Aquino et al. (2007) and by Reed and Aquino (2003). It was proved in different experimental studies by Reed and Aquino (2003).

The question that arises is why Moral Identity activation had no direct effect on immoral behaviour in the first study by Aquino et al. (2007) even though theoretical considerations expected this (Aquino et al., 2007; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Aquino et al. (2009) explain this missing link with the limited strength of the priming procedure through trait-related adjectives. Apparently, Moral Identity activation is strong enough to counter Moral Disengagement but not to reduce immoral behaviour directly.

In the last paragraphs, it was explained theoretically how Moral Identity can be activated and how Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement. Empirical evidence suggests that Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Disengagement reduces immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007). It was explained that this effect is probably based on the expansion of the circle of moral regard and humanization of enemies. This interactive effect is proposed for this present study, too. Differently from the abovementioned studies (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007) Moral Identity activation is not expected to interact with Moral Disengagement measured by a questionnaire but to interact with the Permissive Scenario.
2.3.3 Moral Identity Activation in Interaction with Moral Disengagement in Media

Moral Identity activation is hypothesized to interact with arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in media (Permissive Scenario) reducing support of war. Two mechanisms are assumed to support this hypothesis.

The first mechanism behind this interaction effect is the circle of moral regard expansion (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Singer, 1981; Staub, 1992; Youniss & Yates, 1999). People whose Moral Identity is activated expand their circle of moral regard (Aquino et al., 2007). Supposedly, when they are confronted with the Permissive Scenario, then this circle of moral regard expansion ensures that possible victims of a military intervention and enemies are included inside this circle. Due to the humanization of others, arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are less persuasive and do not trigger personal Moral Disengagement (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 1975; Reed & Aquino, 2003).

A second possible explanation for this interaction effect derives from observational learning and socialization. Reinforcement of behaviour increases the likelihood that this behaviour occurs again (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009). During socialization moral standards are internalized due to reinforcement by the environment (e.g. parents, peers) and observational learning (Bandura, 1999; Bandura & McDonald, 1963). Moral Identity is of certain centrality for the self, depending on the frequency and intensity of reinforcement and learning of knowledge structures comprising moral traits and standards (Aquino et al., 2009). If a person’s Moral Identity is central for this self or if Moral Identity is activated, internalized moral standards and moral behaviour are accessible more easily (see subsection 2.3.1; Aquino et al., 2009). At the same time the person should be more sensitive and attentive to arguments that justify war because he or she has learned that war is immoral. It was described in subsection 2.3.1 that the depiction of justified violence in media has a reinforcing effect for a person’s own immoral behaviour (Meyer, 1972). The same effect is predicted for the Permissive Scenario. This reinforcing effect of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive Scenario) should be diminished when a person’s Moral Identity is activated. As a consequence war is less likely to be supported.

Nevertheless, the abovementioned additional assumption has to be taken into account, since it is not clear how Moral Identity is constituted in particular with regard to war. Is war
considered as something moral or immoral by a person? Aquino and Reed (2002) assume that central traits and internalized moral standards of Moral Identity are the same for every person (Blasi, 1984). This is questionable, because Moral Identity relies on internalized moral standards and traits formed by socialization. Differences in socialization however are not reflected in the study samples of Aquino and Reed (2002), Reed and Aquino (2003), Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009). Aquino and Reed (2002) were using a homogenous study sample which consisted only of US university students to find out trait-related adjectives that could function as situational cues for the activation of Moral Identity. US students belong to a variety of different ethnical backgrounds, but roughly they share a common US American socialization. Accordingly, it is important to include the additional assumption in the analysis.

In the following section, theoretical considerations and empirical evidence will be summarized and transformed into general hypotheses as well as operationalized hypotheses.

2.4 HYPOTHESES

People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 1999). These mechanisms cognitively reconstruct a situation so that immoral behaviour appears moral. Mechanisms include moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic wording, diffusion and displacement of responsibility and dehumanization (Bandura, 1999). Empirical support comes from different studies in which Moral Disengagement was measured by a questionnaire (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf et al., 2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).

Hypothesis 1: Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of immoral behaviour.

Two central questions are interesting for this research: first, why people support war? Second, which factors could possibly diminish this support? Moral Disengagement seems to be a valuable concept to answer the first question. McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show in a large-sampled study that Moral Disengagement does not only apply to one’s own immoral behaviour, but also to the support of war. This finding is supported by Aquino et al. (2007), too. For Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of war it is theoretically necessary
that war is actually judged immoral by a person. Therefore, an additional assumption will be included in each of the following operationalized hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1a: *Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral.*

Media influence personal opinions and behaviour with the help of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 2002). Media influence on aggressive behaviour through Moral Disengagement mechanisms and its reinforcing effect were demonstrated in studies by Meyer (1972), by Berkowitz (1984) and by Berkowitz and Rawlings (1963).

Hypothesis 2: *Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with support of immoral behaviour.*

It is further hypothesized that Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with Moral Disengagement as measured by questionnaire. The reason for this is that personal Moral Disengagement mechanisms are triggered by the media (Meyer, 1972) so that the recipient scores higher in a Moral Disengagement questionnaire.

Hypothesis 3: *Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).*

Parallels between Moral Disengagement and Theory of Just War have been explained for the context of war. These parallels suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms are used in media covering war topics. If this is true, this should affect the audience’s support for immoral behaviour (support of war; Cohrs, 2008) and Moral Disengagement as measured by questionnaire.

For this study newspaper articles about a fictive war will be varied with regard to their permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario all arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. Thus, the Permissive Scenario works as a positive reinforcement for support of war and triggers personal Moral Disengagement. In the Prohibitive Scenario only two arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. Accordingly, the reinforcing effect should be reduced and personal Moral Disengagement should not be triggered to the same extent. However, for Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of war it is theoretically necessary that war is actually judged immoral by a person, too. Therefore, the additional assumption will be included in the operationalized hypothesis, too.
Hypothesis 2a: *a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral.*

Hypothesis 3a: *a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral.*

The second central question for this study is about factors that could possibly diminish immoral behaviour and support of war. Moral Identity and its activation can function as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement. If Moral Identity is activated, knowledge structures which comprise internalized moral standards, traits, goals and behavioural scripts are cognitively better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009). As a result, circle of moral regard is more likely to be expanded and people take into account the suffering of those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater extent (Aquino et al., 2007). The circle of moral regard expansion reduces Moral Disengagement, because the ‘others’ are humanized inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). As a result immoral behaviour is reduced likewise.

Hypothesis 4: *Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (questionnaire)*

Hypothesis 5 + 6: *Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement in media so that respondent’s support for immoral behaviour is reduced as well as Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).*

In the context of war, Moral Identity activation should work similarly. In this study arguments in the Permissive Scenario are based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. Further, the reinforcing effect of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive Scenario) on participants’ support of war should be diminished when a person’s Moral Identity is activated. However, for Moral Disengagement to function in the domain of war, it is theoretically necessary that war is actually judged immoral by a person. Therefore, the additional assumption will be included in the operationalized hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4a: *Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral.*

Hypotheses 5a + 6a: *on the premise that war is considered immoral, Moral Identity activation interacts with the degree of permissiveness of the war scenario; so that the difference in*
support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) between Permissive and Prohibitive Scenarios is smaller, when Moral Identity is activated.

Against theoretical considerations, Moral Identity activation has no direct effect on immoral behaviour in studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009). Apparently the priming procedure to activate Moral Identity is not strong enough to affect immoral behaviour directly.

Hypothesis 7: Moral Identity activation has no effect on the support of immoral behaviour.

Hypothesis 7a: Moral Identity activation has no effect on support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral.

2.5 REASONS FOR THIS STUDY

This study builds on the empirically well-established concept of Moral Disengagement which allows people to conduct immoral behaviour by cognitively reconstructing reality (Bandura 1991, 1999). Some studies suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media increase immoral behaviour (Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972) and support of war (Cohrs, 2008). This study wants to test if the permissiveness of a fictive war scenario written in news style increases support of war. Permissiveness is thereby operationalized through the number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. This is interesting because Theory of Just War criteria found entrance into international law, but have not been studied in a psychological experiment, yet.

A study by Aquino et al. (2007) supports the idea that Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement mechanisms reducing war-related immoral behaviour. This present study wants to test if this interaction effect can be probed for arguments related to Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Just War Theory criteria in media, too.

The hypotheses base on the assumption that people’s internalized moral standards consider war and military interventions as harmful, in other words as immoral behaviour. This is important since Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement are based on internalized moral standards. This additional assumption will be taken into account statistically for the first time.

To sum up, this study wants to give empirical evidence for the concept of Moral Identity activation and the effects of Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media with regard to support of war. Two central questions should be answered by the end of this study. First, is
Moral Disengagement decisive for people to support war? Second, is Moral Identity activation a factor that could diminish Moral Disengagement and thus support of war?
3 METHODS

This chapter will describe the design and the sample of the study (3.1), procedures (3.2) and statistical analysis (3.3) in three different sections.

3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This study employed a 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design. Factor 1 varied the activation of Moral Identity (Independent Variable 1, Moral Identity activation versus control group) and factor 2 varied the permissiveness of a fictive war scenario in a newspaper article (Independent Variable 2, Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). Permissiveness refers to the number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. The trait variable was called Moral Consideration of War and reflects participants’ internalized moral standards with regard to war. It was used to operationalize the additional assumption.

Design was implemented in online-based soSci Survey (Leiner, 2013). Problems that typically arise with online surveys are high drop-out rates and double access (Birnbaum, 2004). Whereas high drop-out rates can only be reduced by an interesting topic and post survey clarification, double access is usually addressed with IP-address configuration. The online platform thereby saves IP-addresses and prohibits the same IP-address from second access to the survey. Saving of IP-addresses reduces anonymity and was thus omitted. Instead it is argued that motivation for multiple access in order to manipulate results should be relatively low. Additionally, the possibility for a second start gives the potential participant an extra opportunity to fill out the survey at a later point in time.

Advantages of online surveys are fast and facile data gathering, few to none transcription errors, the possibility of media demonstration and access to other sample populations than just psychology students. Due to these advantages and because traditional paper pencil methods usually reach the same conclusions as online surveys, the latter was used for this study (Birnbaum, 2004).

Randomization of experimental variables was done with PHP scripts, so that every study participant was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Two face to face pre-tests and two online pre-tests were performed before the beginning of the study. Feedback was integrated into the design. There were no exclusion criteria to participate in this study.
3.1.1 Participants

The online survey was accessible from 18.07.2013 till 31.07.2013. In the last days of survey access, less and less people participated in the study. This is why access was stopped after two weeks. Within this time 292 people accessed the survey including double clicks. In other words, potential participants could have accessed the survey twice using the invitation link. Figure 1 demonstrates that 118 people from a total of 292 people left the questionnaire on the first page. Additional 88 people were leaving after the first and before the survey’s last page. In total 86 participants were randomized to the four experimental conditions and completed the survey (see Figure 1).

Survey invitations were sent to a Facebook group called “Stipendiatinnen und Stipendiaten der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung”, to a mailing list of “Stipendiatinnen und Stipendiaten der Heinrich Böll Stiftung” as well as to relatives and friends of the author. The mailing list and Facebook group comprise students of two political foundations connected to the Green Party and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany. They were chosen in order to gather...
participants from a wide political spectrum. It is important to have participants from right (CDU) to left (Green Party) of the political spectrum because political orientation was shown to be influential on the support of war in prior studies (especially Cohrs, 2008; but see also Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Cohrs, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff, 2004; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; McFarland, 2005).

Participants spent an average time of 21.5 minutes (SD=7.89) completing the survey, whereby minimum time was 7.1 minutes and maximum time was 42.5 minutes.

3.2 PROCEDURES

Participants read a description of the questionnaire’s topic, anonymity assurance and an experimental instruction (see Annex 7.3) before completing socio-demographic information about sex, age, field of studies, political party preferences and political orientation. Afterwards, they were first asked to fill out the Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (Cohrs, 2008) which comprises a subscale about Moral Consideration of War. Second, Moral Identity activation (Independent Variable 1) or control group manipulation took place followed by manipulation check and either a Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario (Independent Variable 2). After reading the scenario, participants were asked to judge possible remedies and to complete the Terrorism Questionnaire as a measure for war-related Moral Disengagement (Jackson, 2005). The last part of the survey consisted of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure (Reed & Aquino, 2003), the possibility to comment and to leave email address for receiving study results. Note that all independent and dependent measures required a response from the participant guaranteeing data usability for statistical analysis.

3.2.1 TRAIT VARIABLES

This study measured two different trait variables. Moral Consideration of War and Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale will be described in the following subsections.

3.2.1.1 Moral Consideration of War

Moral Consideration of War reflects internalized moral standards and moral traits concerning war. Moral Consideration of War was operationalized by using a subscale of Cohrs’ (2008) 21-Item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire. The subscale consisted of four different statements which were rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Two of the four items were inverted (see Table 11 in the annex for German items).

Of course Moral Consideration of War is not the same as internalized moral standards or moral traits with regard to war. However, lacking implicit measures on the particular
characteristics and content of internalized moral standards or moral traits with regard to war, Moral Consideration of War is a first good approximation.

However, Moral Consideration of War reflects internalized moral standards concerning war not so well, if Moral Disengagement occurs. As mentioned above, Moral Disengagement redefines beliefs and cognitively reconstructs reality. It is thus important to measure Moral Consideration of War before Moral Disengagement sets in. The complete 21-Item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire including the subscale Moral Consideration of War was hence completed in the beginning of the experiment.

The Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (Cohrs, 2008) is part of the peace psychological research field related to personality characteristics such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and right-wing extremism (Cohrs, 2004). Besides Moral Consideration of War, the questionnaire covers emotional aspects, the perceived inevitability of war and policy preferences alike (Cohrs, 2008). Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s alpha for all 21 items was 0.94 and for the subscale Moral Consideration of War 0.81. Sufficient internal consistency of the subscale allowed the calculation of an average Moral Consideration of War score consisting of four items. The order of the items of the Military-Pacifism Questionnaire was randomized for every participant respectively.

A high score on the Moral Consideration of War scale implies that war is considered moral. A low score implies that war is considered immoral. Therefore, with regard to the theoretical considerations, a negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) would be expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary only when war is considered immoral. The lower Moral Consideration of War, the higher should be Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).

3.2.1.2 Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale

In case that Moral Identity activation is not successful, internalization subscale of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003) was included at the end of the experiment (see Table 12 for German items). The scale measures Moral Identity centrality. If necessary, the variable can be used as a substitute for Moral Identity activation (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007), e.g. by dividing the sample by median split. German translation of the measure as well as instruction were taken from Tanner, Ryf & Hanselmann (2009). The order of the items of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale was randomized for every participant respectively. Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s alpha is
0.72 for all items of the internalization subscale of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003).

3.2.2 **INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

Two independent variables were used in this study. The following subsections explain Moral Identity activation and the Permissive Scenario.

3.2.2.1 **Moral Identity Activation**

Moral Identity activation or control group was manipulated right after the Military-Pacifism Questionnaire. Manipulation procedure roughly followed Aquino et al. (2007). Study participants in Moral Identity activation group had to think about the following identity-invoking adjectives: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. Then participants were asked to write a short story of one or two paragraphs about themselves using aforementioned adjectives. Control group underwent the same procedure with the following neutral adjectives: carefree, compatible, favourable, happy, harmless, open-minded, polite and respectable. Those adjectives are said to be more devoid of moral content then the prior mentioned (Aquino, 2007). In difference to Aquino (2007), story writing was not done in a handwriting task and there was no cover story. Each participant could only be randomized into Moral Identity activation group or control group.

Both, Moral Identity activation group and control group, had to answer the same four questions for manipulation check. Participants should indicate on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = to some extent to 7 = to a great extent), in how far the written story reflected them as a moral person (1), as a student (2), as part of an organization (3) and safety conscious (4). Moral Identity activation succeeded, when activated participants indicated that their story reflected them significantly more as a moral person than participants in the control group.

3.2.2.2 **Permissive Scenario**

Participants underwent manipulation check and had to read either a Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario afterwards. Both scenarios can be found in German in the annex. Fictive scenarios were used to prevent that people are influenced by prior formed opinions, further information about particular wars and any personal involvement (McAlister et al., 2006; Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 2004). The permissive and prohibitive two-page war scenarios were designed as newspaper articles and written in news style. They had two criteria in common: right cause and failing diplomatic negotiations (see Table 2). While the Prohibitive Scenario lacked or negated further arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just
War criteria, the Permissive Scenario comprised and affirmed all the rest of them. The differences between the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Operationalization of Just War Theory Criteria in Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario (for exact German wording see scenarios in the annex)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Just War Criteria (Moral Disengagement Mechanisms)</th>
<th>Prohibitive Scenario</th>
<th>Permissive Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The war must be based on a right cause, e.g. severe human rights violations happening in a country (Moral Justification)</td>
<td>Systematic and violent displacement of an ethnic minority in Uwanto. A genocide is likely to happen.</td>
<td>Systematic and violent displacement of an ethnic minority in Uwanto. A genocide is likely to happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) right intention, meaning that the true intention lies in the establishment of peace or the prevention of severe evil (Moral Justification)</td>
<td>Intention of the international military intervention in Uwanto was in the establishment of security zones, destroying military targets and occupying important economic industry e.g. oil industry</td>
<td>Intention of the international military intervention in Uwanto was in the establishment of security zones and destroying military targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) proportionality of the means employed (Advantageous Comparison)</td>
<td>States see no other than military means to resolve the conflict in Uwanto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) authorized by legitimate authority, e.g. the UN Security Council (Displacement of Responsibility)</td>
<td>Russia vetoed in the UN security council against a military intervention.</td>
<td>UN security council legitimated the military intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) ultima ratio, other non-military remedies fail success (Advantageous Comparison)</td>
<td>Diplomatic negotiations with the government in Uwanto preceded security council’s decision.</td>
<td>Diplomatic negotiations with the government in Uwanto and economic sanctions preceded security council’s decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) probability of success of for instance subsequent peace agreements (Downgrading, Ignoring or Misconstruing Negative Consequences)</td>
<td>Military power of Uwanto cannot be predicted, because the country imports weapons since the last 5 years. Plus there are few chances for peace after the intervention because the reconstruction and development fund lacks financial means.</td>
<td>Military power of Uwanto is considered weak because economic sanctions prevented the import of military goods in the last 5 years. The development and reconstruction fund has sufficient financing, thus, post-intervention peace seems more likely.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fictive scenarios told the story of Uwanto, a country in which a genocide against an ethnic minority called “Bentale” is likely to happen. The international community is concerned and already put diplomatic pressure on the government of Uwanto. However, the situation worsened in the last weeks and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided whether a military intervention in Uwanto should take place. From here on stories vary in their content. This is shown in Table 2.

Moral Disengagement mechanisms *euphemistic wording* and *dehumanization* were not varied between the two scenarios. Therefore, the two scenarios were written in neutral manner employing no or only weak emotional adjectives. As much as possible, the wording and structure of the sentences were kept the same in both scenarios. Two pictures and a fictive historical introduction box were included in both texts. One picture showed a map of Uwanto and the other depicted a house front covered with bullet holes (copyright by the author of this study). At the end of each text, a short comparison of the arguments in favour and against a military intervention in Uwanto was made salient in a text box. In this text box pro-military intervention arguments outweighed contra ones quantitatively only in the Permissive Scenario. Both scenarios were developed and proven on content validity as well as consistency in discussions with students from International Relations programme of TU Dresden and relatives of the author for several times. Feedback was integrated in the conceptualization of the scenarios.

### 3.2.3 Dependent Variables

#### 3.2.3.1 Support of War, non-military Remedies and Preference of Remedies

Possible reactions towards the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario may be judged differently with regard to quality and intensity (Harff, 1987). This is why different remedies were available for judgement after reading the scenario (1 = no support to 100= full support):

- **a)** no remedies to solve the conflict
- **b)** fact-finding missions and negotiations
- **c)** economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure
- **d)** war

The first main outcome measure was *support of war* in Uwanto (d; scale 1 = no support of war till 100 = full support of war) for the regression analyses. The measure *preference of remedies* was included, too. Here participants had to point out which of the abovementioned remedies (a-d) they preferred most. Additionally, an optional open text item for explication of
the chosen remedy was included. Primary reason for this was to increase participants’ motivation to think about their answers more thoroughly and based on the scenario.

3.2.3.2 Moral Disengagement

Moral Disengagement was the second main outcome measure. For this, the eight item Terrorism Questionnaire by Jackson (2005) was employed. Each item had to be rated on a five-point Likert scale. Only the item concerning dehumanization was changed and adapted for this study. Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s alpha for all Terrorism Questionnaire items was 0.79. Accordingly, for statistical analysis, an average Moral Disengagement score of the eight items was calculated. The order of the items of the Terrorism Questionnaire was randomized for every participant respectively.

In the present study, Moral Disengagement is assumed to justify the remedies chosen by each study participant. However, it is arguable if that can be measured by questionnaire. The Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) can only inadequately reflect people’s inner disengagement and justification. Internal processes of mind, such as Moral Disengagement, are more complex than an eight item questionnaire. Additionally, it is unsure if the questionnaire reflects internal disengagement at all. Perhaps, people start to disengage only because they read the questionnaire, or they do so only for specific Moral Disengagement mechanisms. Likewise it is possible that no internal disengagement happens at all and participants only evaluate the items of the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005). These questions will not be answered by this study. They should, however, be kept in mind for the interpretation of the results.

3.3 Statistical Analysis

Due to interpretative reasons, dichotomous nominal variables (e.g. experimental conditions) were transformed to -1/+1 values so that the amount of change as given by beta weights in regression models has to be multiplied by two (from -1 to 0 and from 0 to 1). Variables for interaction terms were centred to avoid multicollinearity.

Normal distribution of metrical variables was assessed with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) and graphical analysis using Q-Q plots. For mean differences, student T-tests were calculated whereby homogeneity of variances was assessed with Levene's test. In order to avoid alpha error accumulation, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for multiple comparisons. Hypotheses were tested in two different regression models. Correlations were calculated with Pearson product moment correlation coefficients (PPMCC). Level of
significance was set at $\alpha < 0.05$. Study sample of $N > 80$ seems to be sufficient for eight to nine predictors when assuming medium to large effects and $\alpha < 0.05$ (Bortz & Döring, 2002). All statistical analyses were done with SPSS 20.
4 RESULTS

The following chapter is divided in three main sections. The first section looks at descriptive statistics for socio-demographic data, Moral Consideration of War and dependent variables such as support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). The next section is about the manipulation check of Moral Identity activation. The third and last section covers inferential statistics testing the hypotheses of this study with two regression models.

4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The descriptive statistics cover socio-demographic data, Moral Consideration of War scale and dependent variables such as the support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) in different subsections. The goal is to give a broad overview of the study results.

4.1.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

This subsection gives a descriptive overview about gender, age, participants’ field of studies, political party preferences and political orientation.

45 study participants were female and 41 were male. Mean age was 25 years (SD=9.80), with a minimum of 19 and a maximum of 76 years. Age was not following normal distribution and the distribution is right skewed (K-S test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness =3.50).

88 % of the sample were students, 8 % were employed, 3 % were PhD students and 1 % were pensioners. 18.4 % of all students studied political sciences, 14.5 % studied engineering and about 9 % studied cultural and language studies, law and medicine, respectively. 17 % of the students marked category ‘other’ and were not further specified. Categories with less than 9 % were Psychology, Mathematics, Physics and Economics.

Concerning political party preferences, 7% would have vote for Social Democratic Party (SPD), 23% would have voted for CDU/CSU, 59% would have voted for Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 4% would have voted for the Left Party (DIE LINKE) and 7% would have voted for other political parties if the following Sunday (01.08.2013) had been Bundestag elections. Figure 2 illustrates that this distribution did not correspond to the FORSA election survey at that point of time (Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analyse GmbH, 2013).
Regarding political orientation, average was 35.20 (SD=19.90, 1=leftist, 50=middle, 100=right-wing) following right skewed normal distribution (K-S test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot).

### 4.1.2 Moral Consideration of War

Moral Consideration of War scale was about internalized moral standards and important for the additional assumption of the hypotheses. Moral Consideration of War was a subscale of Cohrs’ 21-Item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (2008). Concerning this subscale, four items were averaged. Each item was thereby rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Whereby a higher value implied that participants agree to a greater extent on items which propose military means of conflict resolution as morally acceptable. The mean was 3.37 (SD=1.46) and median was 3, following normal distribution (K-S test, skewness=0.54, graphical analysis with Q-Q plot). Moral Consideration of War was centred for interaction terms. See Table 11 in the annex for means and standard deviations of Moral Consideration of War scale.

### 4.1.3 Dependent Variables

This subsection describes participants’ preference of remedies and the support for each remedy after reading the Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario. Additionally, Moral Disengagement as measured by the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) is covered, too.

#### 4.1.3.1 Support of War, Non-Military Remedies and Preference of Remedies

Preference of remedies was ‘negotiations and observer missions’ for 47 participants, followed by ‘economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure’ for 27 participants. 10 participants preferred
‘war’ above all others and 2 participants preferred ‘no remedies’ most. Concerning the support of each specific remedy (scale from 1 = no support to 100 = high support), highest support was observed for ‘negotiations and observer missions’ (M=84.47, SD=22.92), followed by ‘economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure’ (M=75.71, SD=30.53). Looking at support of ‘war’, average support was 36.02 (SD = 29.6) following normal distribution (K-S test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness=0.56). Support of war is one of the main outcome measures of this study and will be used as a dependent variable in regression model 1.

There were two significant mean differences between experimental groups and the support of different remedies. Firstly, Permissive Scenario (M=42.02, SD=31.07) and Prohibitive Scenario (M=30.56, SD=27.43) differed significantly concerning the support of war (F (1, 84) =3.31, p<0.05, ANOVA see Table 5 in the annex). Secondly, Moral Identity activation (M=90.85, SD=17.58) and control group (M=78.64, SD=25.71) differed significantly concerning the support of ‘negotiations and observer missions’ (F (1, 84) =6.48, p<0.05, ANOVA see Table 6 in the annex).

The explanations in the open text item suggest that most participants thought about their answers thoroughly. Many explained their standpoint in one or two paragraphs with regard to the previous read scenario.

4.1.3.2 Moral Disengagement
Average score over the eight items the Terrorism Questionnaire was computed (five-point Likert scale, Jackson, 2005). Mean was 2.73 (SD = 0.72) following normal distribution (K-S test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness=0.25). Concerning each Moral Disengagement mechanisms, ‘minimizing and ignoring consequences’ had highest acceptance with a mean of 3.27 (SD = 1.13), whereas ‘displacement of responsibility’ was least accepted with a mean of 2.19 (SD=1.14, see Table 7 in the annex).

There was one significant mean difference between experimental groups and the support of different remedies (see Table 8 and Table 11 in the annex). Moral Identity activation (M=3.54, SD=0.98) and control group (M=3.02, SD=1.21) differed significantly concerning ‘minimizing and ignoring consequences’ (F (1, 84) =4.60, p<0.05, ANOVA see Table 8 in the annex).
4.2 Manipulation Check

The following section explores if Moral Identity activation was successful. This is a prerequisite regarding hypothesized effects of Moral Identity activation. Moral Identity activation and subsequent manipulation check were done before participants read the Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario.

Moral Identity activation and control group manipulation was realized with the task to write down short personal stories using trait-related adjectives. Study participants were then asked to indicate how much the story they wrote reflected how they see themselves: (1) as a student, (2) as a member of an organization, (3) as a moral person and (4) as safety conscious (on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = to some extent to 7 = to a great extent). The resulting four different scores were used as dependent variables for MANOVA. Moral Identity activation was used as independent factor. MANOVA revealed significant differences in dependent variables (Pillai-Spur = 0.30, F (4, 81) =306, p=0.00; Pillai-Spur test requirements were confirmed with Mauchly's sphericity test).

Effectiveness of Moral Identity activation was further proven with a single one-way ANOVA using these items (1-4) as dependent variables. ANOVA addresses alpha error accumulation of multiple testing. The Moral Identity activation condition had a significant effect only on the extent to which participants’ stories reflected them as moral people (F (1, 84) = 20.89, p<0.01). Participants who underwent Moral Identity activation said that the story reflected more about them as a moral person (M=5.83, SD=1.18) than those who were in control group (M=4.27, SD=1.88) suggesting that Moral Identity manipulation succeeded in increasing the salience of Moral Identity. No significant differences were found for the other items (all F’s (1, 85) <1.50, p>0.05), for all mean differences see Table 10 in the annex).

An average score of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale was built (Reed & Aquino, 2003). It was the last scale that participants had to complete in the experiment. Student’s T-Test for the Moral Identity activation group (M=4.29, SD=0.50) and control group (M=3.92, SD=0.76) revealed significant differences in the total Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (T (1, 83) = -2.62, p<0.05). Levene’s test revealed homogeneity of variance (F (1, 83) =3.10, p<0.05). This finding suggests that Moral Identity activation succeeded in increasing the salience of Moral Identity until the end of the experiment.
4.3 HYPOTHESES TESTS

The goal of this section is to test hypotheses with two different regression models. Hypotheses were tested with two different regression models using support of war (model 1) and Moral Disengagement (model 2) as dependent variables. First, regression models will be described. Second, each hypothesis (1-6) is tested.

Model 1 is shown in Table 3 and Equation 1. In model 1, support of war was regressed on Moral Consideration of War (MCW), Permissive Scenario (PS), Moral Identity activation (MIA) as well as three first and one second order interaction terms (see Table 3 and Equation 1). Moral Consideration of War was centred for interaction terms. Due to interpretative reasons, dichotomous experimental conditions were transformed to -1/+1 values.

**Equation 1: Regression Model 1**

\[ \text{Support of War} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MCW} + \beta_2 \text{PS} + \beta_3 \text{MIA} + \beta_4 \text{MIA} \times \text{MCW} + \beta_5 \text{PS} \times \text{MIA} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{PS} \times \text{MCW} + \beta_7 \text{PS} \times \text{MIA} \times \text{MCW} \]

**Table 3: Model 1, Support of War (N=85)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Not standardized coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term (Support of War)</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Consideration of War (MCW)</td>
<td>12.22</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>6.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive Scenario (PS)</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity Activation (MIA)</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA x MCW</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MIA</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MCW</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MIA x MCW</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Corrected $R^2 = 0.36$, Moral Consideration of War (from 1 = low to 7 = high) was centred for interaction terms, Scenario (Permissive Scenario = 1, Prohibitive Scenario= -1), Moral Identity Activation (Yes = 1, No= -1)
Model 2 is shown in Table 4 and Equation 2. In model 2, Moral Disengagement was regressed on Moral Consideration of War (MCW), support of war, Permissive Scenario (PS), Moral Identity activation (MIA) as well as four first and one second order interaction terms (see Table 4 and Equation 2). Moral Consideration of War and support of war were centred for interaction terms. Due to interpretative reasons, dichotomous experimental conditions were transformed to -1/+1 values.

**Equation 2: Regression Model 2**

**Moral Disengagement**

\[ \text{Moral Disengagement} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MCW + \beta_2 PS + \beta_3 MIA + \beta_4 \text{Support of War} + \beta_5 MIA \times MCW + \beta_6 PS \times MIA + \beta_7 PS \times MCW + \beta_8 \text{Support of War} \times MCW + \beta_9 PS \times MIA \times MCW \]

**Table 4: Model 2, Moral Disengagement (N=85)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Not standardized coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term (Moral Disengagement)</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Consideration of War (MCW)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive Scenario (PS)</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity Activation (MIA)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of War</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MIA</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA x MCW</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MCW</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of War x MCW</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS x MIA x MCW</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Corrected $R^2 = 0.47$, Moral Consideration of War scale (1 = low to 7 = high) was centred for interaction terms, Scenario (Permissive Scenario = 1, Prohibitive Scenario = -1), Moral Identity Activation (Yes = 1, No = -1), support of war (from 1 to 100) was centred for interaction term.
Of course Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) could have been included in model 1, too. However, Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) was measured after support of war. Hence, it is more logical to not include this variable in model 1 and test for instance hypothesis 1a in model 2 (when controlling for other experimental variables).

Important premises for regression models such as normal distribution of metrical variables have been confirmed. Multicollinearity implies significant inter-correlation of predictor variables and is given only for support of war and Moral Consideration of War. Heteroscedasticity means heterogeneity of variance and distorts regression analyses. It was checked for with graphical analysis, plotting the two dependent measures against their residuals. Heteroscedasticity was observed neither for support of war nor for Moral Disengagement. Thus, premises for regression analyses seem fulfilled and hypotheses will be tested in the following.

4.3.1 HYPOTHESIS 1A

It was predicted that Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. To answer this hypothesis, mean Moral Disengagement score as measured by the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) was multiplied with Moral Consideration of War. Both variables were centred before multiplication. The resulting interaction term correlated positively with support of war (r=0.23, p=0.04, PPMCC). When controlling for experimental variables interaction term of support of war and Moral Consideration of War was not significant in model 2 (B $<$ 0.01, SE $<$ 0.01, T (75) = -0.88, p=0.38, see Table 4). Note that a high score on the Moral Consideration of War subscale implies that war is considered moral. A low score implies that war is considered immoral. Due to this codification, correlation would have been expected to be negative. Hypothesis 1a is thus rejected.

This finding will be further looked at: for demonstrative reasons, sample was divided by median split of Moral Consideration of War scale. Correlation of Moral Disengagement and support of war for participants scoring above 3 on Moral Consideration of War scale (war is considered moral), was positive and significant (r=0.58, p$<$0.01, PPMCC). For participants scoring below 3 (war is considered immoral), this correlation was positive and significant, too (r=0.53, p$<$0.01, PPMCC). Next, cut-off point of moral consideration of war was set up to 5 including only participants who agreed to a great extent to statements on the morality of war (n=14). The resulting correlation of Moral Disengagement and support of war was still positive but not significant anymore (r=0.36, p=0.20, PPMCC). However, the theoretical
considerations would expect the correlation (Moral Disengagement x support of war) to be negative especially for the case that participants scored below 3 for Moral Consideration of War. Because the lower Moral Consideration of War, the more disengagement from internalized moral standards would be necessary. On the other hand, Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement correlated positively (r=0.67, p<0.01, PPMCC). However, a negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) would be expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary only when war is considered immoral by internalized moral standards. The lower Moral Consideration of War, the higher should be Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). 

Due to the findings in the abovementioned paragraph, it is possible that the additional assumption, i.e. internalized moral standards, was not operationalized well by using the Moral Consideration of War scale. Hence, for this hypothesis 1a as well as for all the following hypotheses, main effects or first order interaction effects disregarding the additional assumption will be reported, too. Note that these effects were not predicted by the hypotheses. 

Disregarding the additional assumption, correlation of support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) was positive (r=0.58, p<0.01, PPMCC). Relationship between the two variables was significant and positive when controlled for other experimental variables in model 2 (B<0.01, SE<0.01, T (75) = 2.78, p=0.01, see Table 4).

4.3.2 Hypotheses 2A + 3A

It was predicted that a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with the support of war (hypothesis 2a) and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire, hypothesis 3a), on the premise that war is considered immoral. Regarding hypothesis 2a, interaction of Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on support of war in model 1 (B=0.72, SE=1.80, T(76)=0.40, p=0.69, see Table 3). Thus, hypothesis 2a is rejected. Concerning hypothesis 3a, interaction of Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on Moral Disengagement in model 2 (B=0.04, SE=0.04, T (75) = 0.86, p=0.40, see Table 4). Consequently, hypothesis 5a is also disproved.

In order to estimate the relationship between Permissive Scenario on support of war and Moral Disengagement without the additional assumption (Moral Consideration of War), main effects of Permissive Scenario are reported. The Permissive Scenario had on the one hand a significant positive effect on support of war, when controlled for other experimental variables.
in regression analysis ($B=6.23$, SE=$2.58$, T ($76$) = $2.43$, p=$0.02$, see Table 3). This main effect is visualized in Figure 3.

![Figure 3](image.png)

**Figure 3**: Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity Activation. The Figure illustrates significant main effect of Permissive Scenario on support of war and not significant interaction of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario on support of war.

On the other hand, the Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on Moral Disengagement when controlled for the other experimental variables ($B=-0.10$, SE=$0.06$, T ($75$) = $-1.62$, p=$0.11$, see Table 4).

4.3.3 **Hypothesis 4A**

It was predicted that Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral. With regard to this hypothesis, interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Consideration of War had a significant effect on Moral Disengagement ($B=-0.10$, SE=$0.04$, T ($75$) = $-2.40$, p=$0.02$, see Table 4 and Figure 4). That is to say, the gradient of the slope decreased in regression model 2 when Moral Identity was activated. Note that high numbers of Moral Consideration of War reflect participants’ opinion that war is moral, in other words that military means of conflict resolution are morally acceptable. Therefore, hypothesis 4a is rejected.
This finding will be further explained with regard to Figure 4: for demonstrative reasons, sample was divided by median split (median = 3), representing two equally sized groups that either judge war as something immoral (n=44) or moral (n=42). It was already described for hypothesis 1a that relationship for Moral Disengagement and Moral Consideration of War was expected to be negative. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary only when war is considered immoral, i.e. Moral Consideration of War is low. Figure 4 illustrates that the relationship between Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement is positive.

![Figure 4](image.png)

**Figure 4:** Moral Disengagement as a function of Moral Consideration of War (MCW, median split) and Moral Identity activation. Scores below median imply that war is considered immoral, whereas scores above median imply that war is considered moral.

Further, Figure 4 illustrates that Moral Identity activation increases Moral Disengagement scores from 2.01 (SD=0.49) to 2.64 (SD=0.56) for participants who judge war as something immoral (Moral Consideration of War below median, left side of X-axis, n=44). This is contrary to hypothesis 4a which predicted that Moral Identity activation reduces Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral.

In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation on Moral Disengagement without the additional assumption (Moral Consideration of War), main effect of Moral Identity activation is reported. Moral Identity activation had a positive but not significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B=0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) =1.68, p=0.10, see Table 4).
4.3.4 **Hypotheses 5a + 6a**

It was predicted that Moral Identity activation interacts with the degree of permissiveness of the war scenario, on the premise that war is considered immoral. In particular the difference in support of war (hypothesis 5a) and Moral Disengagement (hypothesis 6a) between Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario is smaller when Moral Identity is activated.

Regarding hypothesis 5a, second order interaction term of Moral Identity activation, Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had a not significant effect on the support of war ($B=-0.51$, SE=1.8, $T (76) = -0.28$, $p=0.78$, see Table 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6). Thus, hypothesis 5a is disproved.

**Figure 5:** Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War above median suggesting that they judge war as moral.
Figure 6: Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War below median suggesting that they judge war as immoral.

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the not significant first order interaction effects of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario on support of war, respectively for Moral Consideration above median (Figure 5) and below (Figure 6).

Second order interaction term of Moral Identity activation, Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had a not significant effect on Moral Disengagement ($B = -0.02, SE=0.04, T (75) = -0.40, p=0.70$, see Table 4, Figure 7 and Figure 8). As a result, hypothesis 6a is also rejected.
Figure 7: Moral Disengagement as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War above median suggesting that they judge war as something moral.

Figure 8: Moral Disengagement as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War below median suggesting that they judge war as something immoral.

Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict the not significant first order interaction effects on Moral Disengagement of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario, respectively for Moral Consideration of War above median (Moral Consideration of War > 3, Figure 7) and below (Moral Consideration of War < 3, Figure 8).
In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation in interaction with Permissive Scenario without the additional assumption, first order interaction without Moral Consideration of War will be reported. First order interaction of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on the support of war (B=1.54, SE=2.58, T (76) =0.60, p=0.55, see Table 3 and Figure 3). Further, first order interaction of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.05, SE=0.06, T (75) = -0.78, p=0.44, see Table 4).

4.3.5 HYPOTHESIS 7A
Moral Identity activation was expected to have no effect on support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. Regarding this hypothesis, interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on support of war in model 1 (B= -0.39, SE=1.80, T (76) = -0.21, p=0.83, see Table 3). Thus, hypothesis 7a is affirmed.

In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation and the support of war without the additional assumption, main effect will be reported. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war (B=2.89, SE=2.58, T (76) = 1.10, p=0.27, see Table 3).
5 DISCUSSION

This study seeks to answer two key questions. Firstly, is Moral Disengagement decisive for people to support war? Secondly, is Moral Identity activation a factor that could diminish Moral Disengagement and thus support of war? The rationale for the first question was derived from the Socio Cognitive Theory of Morality (Bandura, 1999) and from the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009) for the second one. Seven hypotheses were deducted from these theories to find answers to the two questions. A 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design was employed to test the hypotheses. Factor 1 varied the activation of Moral Identity (Moral Identity activation versus control group) and factor 2 varied how permissive the war scenario was depicted with regard to Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). An additional assumption took into account in how far participants’ internalized moral standards consider war as immoral. This was done with a Moral Consideration of War scale.

All but one hypothesis of this study were rejected: regarding hypothesis 1a, there was a positive correlation between the interaction term support of war and Moral Consideration of War on the one hand and Moral Disengagement on the other. However, the correlation should have been negative due to the codification of Moral Consideration of War. Hypotheses 2a and 3a were rejected, since the Permissive Scenario in interaction with Moral Consideration of War failed to increase support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). Hypothesis 4a was also disproved, Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Consideration of War had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement. Due to the codification of Moral Consideration of War the correlation should have been positive. Considering hypotheses 5a and 6a it was found that the second order interaction terms of Moral Identity activation, Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect neither on support of war nor on Moral Disengagement. Only hypothesis 7a was affirmed. As expected, Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on support of war.

The results will be discussed more deeply in the following two sections (5.1 and 5.2). It is proposed that there were methodological problems with regard to the additional assumption, i.e. measurement of internalized moral standards by Moral Consideration of War scale. These problems will be discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 looks at simple main effects disregarding the additional assumption, in other words Moral Consideration of War. Section
5.5 is about limitations to this study with regard to the sample and methodology. A final conclusion will be provided in section 5.6.

5.1 Moral Disengagement and Support of War

People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 1999). Mechanisms include ‘moral justification’, ‘advantageous comparison’, ‘euphemistic wording’, ‘diffusion and displacement of responsibility’ and ‘dehumanization’ (Bandura, 1999). McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show that Moral Disengagement mechanisms do not only apply to a person’s immoral behaviour, but also to the support of war. It was therefore hypothesized (Hypothesis 1a) that Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. This additional assumption was included, because for Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of war it is theoretically necessary that war is actually judged immoral by a person. This additional assumption was operationalized by the Moral Consideration of War scale and was included in each of the hypotheses. A high score on the scale means that war is considered moral and a low score that war is considered immoral.

For hypothesis 1a, a significant correlation between interaction term of Moral Disengagement and Moral Consideration of War on the one hand and support of war on the other was found ($r=0.23$, $p=0.04$, PPMCC). Hypothesis 1a was still rejected because correlation should have been negative. To explain this, the sample was divided into two groups by a median split with regard to the Moral Consideration of War scale (first group = low score = war is considered immoral, second group = high score = war is considered moral). The correlations between the support of war and Moral Disengagement were positive and roughly equal for both groups. However, the theoretical considerations would expect the correlation to be negative especially for the first group. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary to a greater extent if war is considered immoral, i.e. the lower the Moral Consideration of War score. This finding puts doubts on whether the Moral Consideration of War scale really measured internalized moral standards. There are methodological problems with this scale which will be addressed.

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2 It would have been possible to transform the codification of the Moral Consideration of War scale. So that a high score means that war is considered immoral and a low score the opposite. Then, the hypotheses should have been changed, too. For instance for hypothesis 1a: Moral Disengagement within media correlates negatively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered moral. It was refrained from this because it seemed counter intuitive to the author.
in section 5.3. Possibly, due to these problems most of the other hypotheses were disproved, too.

Media influence personal opinions and behaviour with the help of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 2002). For this study newspaper articles about a fictive war scenario were varied with regard to their permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario all arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. In the Prohibitive Scenario only two arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria were included. Parallels between Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria have been explained. Hypothesis 2a and 3a accordingly predicted that a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral. Results from regression models 1 and 2 indicate that hypotheses 2a and 3a are rejected. It could be interpreted that positive reinforcement of arguments that justify war in the Permissive Scenario did not work to increase support of war as expected (cf. Bandura et al., 1975; Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz and Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). Further, personal Moral Disengagement perhaps had not been triggered by the arguments given in the Permissive Scenario (Cohrs, 2008). However, it seems more likely that the additional assumption was operationalized inadequately (see section 5.3). Accordingly, the question whether Moral Disengagement increases a person’s support of war cannot be answered finally at this point.

5.2 Moral Identity and Support of War

Moral Identity and its activation can function as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement and thus diminish support of war. Manipulation check suggested that Moral Identity activation succeeded in increasing the salience of Moral Identity within the participants. Therefore, it was first tested if Moral Identity activation had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war was considered immoral (hypothesis 4a). The interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Consideration of War had a significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.10, SE=0.04, T (75) = -2.40, p=0.02, see Table 4 and Figure 4). With regard to the direction of the effect, hypothesis 4a was rejected. To explain this, the sample was divided into two groups by a median split with regard to the Moral Consideration of War scale (first group = low score = war is considered immoral, second group = high score = war is considered moral). Contrary to the prediction, Moral Identity activation increased Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) from 2.01
(SD=0.49) to 2.64 (SD=0.56) when looking at participants who consider war as immoral (see also Figure 4). Most likely this is because of methodological problems with regard to the additional assumption (see section 5.3).

Hypothesis 5a + 6a tested the interaction effect of the two experimental variables on support of war and Moral Disengagement. On the premise that war was considered immoral, Moral Identity activation was proposed to interact with the degree of permissiveness of the war scenario. In particular the difference in the support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) between Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario was supposed to be smaller, when Moral Identity was activated. Results indicate that hypotheses 5a + 6a had to be rejected because there was no significant effect. These results could lead to the interpretation that Moral Identity activation did not make knowledge structures which comprise internalized moral standards, traits, goals and behavioural scripts cognitively better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009). Further, circle of moral regard was not expanded and ‘others’ were not humanized and instead excluded from inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). At the end Moral Disengagement mechanisms would not have been prevented because humanization failed.

Hypothesis 7a is the only hypothesis that was affirmed. Moral Identity activation had no effect on support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. This result can be found in the studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009), too.

However, conclusions on a functional level and with regard to the second central question would be too rash, since the additional assumption was included in hypotheses 4a, 5a, 6a and 7a, respectively. It was already mentioned that methodological problems with the measurement of Moral Consideration of War occurred. These will be discussed in the following section.

5.3 Methodological Problems

In this section conceptual parallels between Moral Consideration of War items (Cohrs, 2008) and items of Moral Disengagement (Jackson, 2005; Terrorism Questionnaire) will be analysed. High positive correlations between the items will be used to support the considerations.

Certain methodological inconsistencies appear when looking into items that were supposed to measure Moral Consideration of War. Moral Consideration of War was supposed to measure internalized moral standards and moral traits concerning war. Moral Consideration of War
was a subscale of Cohrs’ (2008) 21-item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire. Reviewing 3 of the 4 Moral Consideration of War items (see Table 11 in the annex for German items), it appears that they are similar to Moral Disengagement items (see Table 7 in the annex for German items). More specifically they are related to ‘moral justification’ mechanism, for instance: *War can be ethically justified when fighting terrorism* (1) or *War can be ethically justified when fighting for peace and human rights* (2) or *Use of military force violates the rules of civil life* (3, inverted) as compared to *It is irresponsible to renounce the use of military force if a contribution to world-peace can be made by it* (Item 1; Jackson, 2005; Terrorism Questionnaire). These three explicit items are conceptually related to Moral Disengagement because they comprise a disengagement or reason for accepting that war is moral. The remaining item says *War is morally condemnable as a matter of principle* (4, inverted). It is not sure if it implies autonomous disengagement or not. Because if someone accepts this moral statement in favour of war, then he or she perhaps thinks about why accepting it. This search for reasons for war represents already one mechanism of Moral Disengagement (‘moral justification’). And even if someone accepts this statement because it simply reflects his or her internalized moral standard, the Moral Disengagement for those standards could have happened before.

It was argued that Moral Disengagement cannot be ruled out while measuring internalized moral standards, i.e. Moral Consideration on War (Cohrs, 2008; Military-Pacifism Questionnaire). Moral Consideration of War was measured in the beginning of the study. It is known from other studies that Moral Disengagement prior to the immoral behaviour correlates positively with the immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999; McAlister et al., 2006). In the case of this study the measurement of Moral Consideration of War which included Moral Disengagement already, increased support of war. Therefore, Moral Consideration of War scale explains much of the variance in the two regression models. The relationship between the Moral Consideration of War scale and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) was also significant and positive when controlled for other experimental variables in model 2 (B = 0.23, SE=0.05, T (75) = 4.44, p<0.01, see Table 4). Further, the simple correlation between Moral Consideration of War scale and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) is relatively high (r=0.58, p<0.01, PPMCC), too. However, a negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War (low score = war is considered immoral, high score = war is considered moral) and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) was expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary to a greater extent, the lower the Moral Consideration of War score, i.e. when war is considered immoral.
In conclusion, the conceptual parallels between Moral Consideration of War items (Cohrs, 2008) and items of Moral Disengagement (Jackson, 2005; Terrorism Questionnaire) as well as their high positive correlation suggest that the scale is measuring something similar to Moral Disengagement. Moral Consideration of War does not - if at all - solely reflect internalized moral standards because it includes some type of Moral Disengagement, too. Therefore, it is plausible that measuring Moral Consideration of War in the beginning of the study distorted the effects that were supposed to occur in this study (hypotheses 2a-6a).

Strictly speaking, the abovementioned conclusion would prohibit further discussion about possible theoretical implications concerning the interaction terms of Moral Consideration of War. That is, because Bandura’s Socio Cognitive Theory of Morality (1999) as well as Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino et al. (2009) rest upon the assumption that people have internalized moral standards on which moral behaviour is based on.

Should the discussion stop here, since the true internalized moral standards of study participants are unknown?

Remembering that internalized moral standards are a result of socialization, it can be argued that study participants underwent roughly the similar socialization processes. More general moral norms and standards can be considered fairly similar for all Germans: due to collectively traded experiences of World War I and II in school or through parents and grandparents; due to the experience of modern wars in Kosovo or Afghanistan in the news. If internalized moral standards concerning war are assumed the same for all study participants, the majority of them were German students, then discussion may proceed with regard to the main effects. Thereby, war is assumed to be immoral. Hence, the additional assumption is disregarded statistically only and not theoretically.

5.4 DISCUSSION MAIN EFFECTS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTION

Concerning the support of war, regression analysis (model 1) suggested that only the Permissive Scenario had significant positive influence (B=6.23, SE=2.58, T (76) = 2.43, p=0.02, see Table 3). Moral Identity did not have significant effects on support of war (B=2.89, SE=2.58, T (76) = 1.10, p=0.27). Interaction effect of experimental variables was not significant (B=1.54, SE=2.58, T (76) =0.60, p=0.55), but Moral Consideration of War had a positive effect on support of war (B=12.22, SE=1.80, T (76) =6.80, p<0.01).

Concerning Moral Disengagement, regression model 2 suggested that support of war had a significant positive influence (B < 0.01, SE<0.01, T (75) = 2.78, p=0.01, see Table 4).
Further, Moral Consideration of War had a positive effect (B = 0.23, SE=0.05, T (75) = 4.44, p<0.01 see Table 4). Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had almost significant effects on Moral Disengagement. Moral Identity activation had a positive effect on Moral Disengagement (B=0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) =1.68, p=0.10, see Table 4). Permissive Scenario had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) = -1.62, p=0.11, see Table 4).

All significant main effects and almost significant (p=0.10 and p=0.11) main effects are illustrated in Figure 9. Almost significant effects are included because in a larger sample they are likely to reach level of significance of p<0.05 (Bortz & Döring, 2002).

**Figure 9:** Overview of study results disregarding additional assumption statistically. +, - refer to the direction of the effect. Parentheses refer to almost significant effects.

In the following, the focus is put on the discussion of main effects disregarding the additional assumption. Certainly these effects were not predicted in the hypotheses and some are not significant. Therefore, all theoretical conclusions will be made carefully. Subsection 5.4.1 will concentrate on Moral Disengagement and subsection 5.4.2 is about the hypotheses related to Moral Identity activation.
5.4.1 Moral Disengagement

The positive correlation between the outcome measures support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) is evident in this study when the additional assumption is disregarded (hypothesis 1a). This result confirms findings of prior studies (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf et al., 2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).

With regard to Moral Disengagement within media, fictive war scenarios written in news style were differentiated in their grade of permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario all arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. Thus, the Permissive Scenario, in contrast to the Prohibitive Scenario, works as a positive reinforcement for support of war and triggers personal Moral Disengagement. It was predicted that a Permissive Scenario enhances support of war and therefore also Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) as compared to the Prohibitive Scenario.

Referring to hypothesis 2a without the additional assumption, a Permissive Scenario increased the support of war expectedly. The Permissive Scenario as compared to the Prohibitive Scenario, had quantitatively more and qualitatively better arguments in favour of support of war. These arguments corresponded to Moral Disengagement mechanisms: firstly, all non-military options were already exhausted and hence not useful anymore (‘ultima ratio’ criteria and ‘advantageous comparison’). Secondly, in the Permissive Scenario the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) granted permission for a military intervention (‘legitimization’ criteria and ‘displacement of responsibility’). This permission from the UNSC may be seen as an expert and a higher authority to which people are obedient (Milgram, 1975). Responsibility for possible immoral behaviour may be displaced to this higher authority (Bandura, 1999). Further, the decision of many countries in the UNSC diffuses responsibility among them and likewise the responsibility of possible negative consequences (military intervention). This diffusion of responsibility of immoral behaviour could have added to an increased support of war or at least counter the state of inaction that is usually found in groups due to diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968). Further, the UNSC functions as an expert in the topic of military interventions. Experts are said to be a strong argument and may have played a major role in the support of war, too (Stroebe, 2007). Thirdly, the probability of success for post-intervention peace was varied between the two scenarios. In the Permissive Scenario harmful consequences of a military intervention were ‘ignored and misconstrued’. This is as another mechanism of Moral Disengagement. In summary, Moral Disengagement
mechanisms within the Permissive Scenario increased the support of war. It is suggested that the arguments worked as a positive reinforcement for the individual support of war.

Given on the one hand that the Permissive Scenario succeeded in increasing the support of war, it is striking that on the other hand it decreased Moral Disengagement (see hypothesis 3a without additional assumption). This effect was almost significant (p=0.11). Apparently, arguments that rest on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in the Permissive Scenario did not trigger and enhance personal Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). Accordingly, it is difficult to estimate which kind of the arguments was most compelling to study participants, i.e. which Moral Disengagement mechanism worked best. Why did the Permissive Scenario not increase Moral Disengagement?

One explanation is that the support of war was not considered immoral anymore because Moral Disengagement mechanisms were included in the prior read scenario. If war was justified in this specific case, there was no need to disengage later on as measured by Moral Disengagement questionnaire. This idea proposes that morality is different from situation to situation, in which the use of military force can be either right or wrong, moral or immoral. Maybe Moral Disengagement is already taken over by the Permissive Scenario reducing the need for each participant to disengage personally as measured by the subsequent Moral Disengagement questionnaire. Data reflects this consideration with an almost significant negative effect of Permissive Scenario on Moral Disengagement. To sum up, it is suggested that Moral Disengagement is taken over by the Permissive Scenario and consequently does not trigger personal Moral Disengagement. In fact, Permissive Scenario had a negative effect of Moral Disengagement which was almost significant (p=0.11).

Internalized moral standards have not been taken into account in the explanations of this subsection. It is unknown if war was really considered immoral by the participants. Hence, conclusions on a more abstract level of immoral behaviour are refrained from in this case.

5.4.2 MORAL IDENTITY

Moral Identity activation was hypothesized to counter arguments that legitimize immoral behaviour (Moral Disengagement) and therefore indirectly reduce support of immoral behaviour (support of war; Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). The results of this study reflect this only in parts even though manipulation check suggested success of Moral Identity activation.
Concerning hypothesis 4a without the additional assumption, Moral Identity activation increased Moral Disengagement in this study (p=0.10). However, Moral Identity and its activation were said to function as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement: if Moral Identity was activated, internalized moral standards were said to be cognitively better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009). As a result, the circle of moral regard should have been more likely to be expanded and people should have taken into account the suffering of those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater extent (Aquino et al., 2007). The circle of moral regard expansion should have reduced Moral Disengagement, because the ‘others’ would have been humanized inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). However, Moral Identity activation was not negatively related to Moral Disengagement. Instead, it had an almost significant (p=0.10) positive effect in this study contradicting findings of studies by Reed and Aquino (2003), Aquino et al. (2007).

A possible explanation can be found with hindsight to the extent to which participants support war. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war. As support of war was not zero, the average participant should have reason to disengage at least a little bit. It is plausible that Moral Identity activation increased participants’ inner urge to disengage from their support of war. This is because they are more aware of their internalized moral standards and that war is considered immoral. Hence, Moral Identity activation increased Moral Disengagement (p=0.10). Unfortunately, it is unknown if internalized moral standards of study participants considered war as immoral.

Referring to hypothesis 7a without the additional assumption, Moral Identity activation had no direct effect on the support of war. This is reflected in studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009), too. Presumably, Moral Identity activation was not strong enough to make a direct difference in support of war (Aquino et al., 2009). The manipulation of Moral Identity was not targeted thematically at the immoral behaviour, i.e. Support of war. A study by Shu, Gino, & Bazerman (2011) shows that a stronger and thematically targeted manipulation of Moral Identity indeed succeeds in reducing immoral behaviour. In their study Moral Identity was activated by reading and signing an honour code which was thematically related to the dependent measure of cheating in a test (Shu et al., 2011). However, looking closer at the data, there are indeed differences that Moral Identity activation provoked in other remedies than the support of war (see annex, Table 6). Morally activated participants supported less severe remedies, i.e. ‘negotiations and observer missions’, to a significant greater extent than participants whose Moral Identity was not activated. Higher support of
‘negotiations and observer missions’ can be seen as something less violent than the support of war. This result provides evidence for theoretical considerations concerning Moral Identity. More generally speaking, Moral Identity activation did not succeed in reducing immoral behaviour (support of war), but instead increased moral behaviour (negotiations and observer missions). This conclusion is of course only valid if war is assumed to be immoral and ‘negotiations and observer missions’ as moral.

With regard to hypothesis 5a without the additional assumption, there is no evidence that Moral Identity in interaction with Permissive Scenario reduced the support of war. This effect is also not significant when taking the additional assumption into account. For hypothesis 5a conclusions on a theoretical level have a slightly stronger basis, since it did not make a difference whether the additional assumption was taken into account or not. It was predicted that Moral Identity activation reduces the reinforcing effect on support of war by arguments that justify war. Arguments were based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in the Permissive Scenario. Further, it was predicted that the Permissive Scenario cannot trigger personal Moral Disengagement due to the circle of moral regard expansion. Apparently, these functional predictions did not work sufficiently.

The first possible explanation is that Moral Identity activation was neither strong enough nor thematically targeted enough to the context of war (see paragraphs above). Therefore, the predicted functional relationships were prevented. The second explanation relates to Moral Identity centrality. It has been shown in the studies by Aquino et al. (2009) that the effect of Moral Identity activation on Moral Disengagement and subsequent immoral behaviour depends on the trait variable Moral Identity centrality. Moral Identity centrality was measured at the end of this study (Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale by Reed & Aquino, 2003). However, the variable was not taken into account for the analysis since it was influenced by prior Moral Identity activation (see section 4.2).

On a more abstract level, unexpectedly Moral Identity activation had a positive effect on moral behaviour. However, it did not interact with Moral Disengagement in media, reducing immoral behaviour. It was proposed that Moral Identity activation procedure would need to be stronger and targeted more specifically to the domain of the immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009). This, however, would make the concept of Moral Identity less appealing because initially it was interesting due to its generality: that Moral Identity could be activated with general trait-related adjectives, interact with Moral Disengagement and, hence, reduce specific immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007). Additionally, it is not clear in how far other
psychological mechanisms play a role when Moral Identity activation is targeted more specifically at the immoral behaviour. In summary, Moral Identity activation did not succeed to interact with Moral Disengagement in media diminishing immoral behaviour. Other ideas such as the web-based platform peacetest.org seem more promising to prevent Moral Disengagement and support of war (Howard, Shegog, Grussendorf, Benjamins, Stelzig, & McAlister, 2007).

5.5 LIMITATIONS

Limitations to this study with regard to the sample and methodology will be discussed in the following two subsections.

5.5.1 SAMPLE

This study intended to get participants from people of a wide political spectrum. Obviously the sample of this study was not representative for German population, since the sample had not been drawn randomly. In addition to it, most of the participants were students. With regard to political orientation, a clear majority of the study sample would have voted for the Green Party and held consequently more leftist political views than it would have been expected in a representative sample (see Figure 2).

Further, the sample is a highly sophisticated one regarding knowledge on political topics. This is because most participants were recruited from two political student foundations which have political commitment as an inclusion criteria. Individuals who have a strong opinion on political topics are not only more likely to recognize which side of an issue is consistent with their beliefs, they are also more likely to counter argue information that is not consistent with their view (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lodge & Taber, 2000; McGuire, 1964; Nelson et al., 1997; Zaller, 1992). Arguments in the Permissive Scenario could have had a stronger effect on the support of war for people with a weaker political opinion. Therefore, the generalization of the results to a broader population with less political interest seems inadequate. Further, this fact may have led to the rejection of most of the hypotheses regarding Moral Identity activation. If a person has a clear and strong opinion on war, Moral Identity activation is not likely to make a significant change.

A proportionally high drop-out rate of about 70 % was observed in this study leading to a relatively small sample for the regression models. The high number of participants leaving on the introductory page of the experiment suggests that these participants had little motivation to continue. Additional 88 participants left after the first page and before the last, most likely
due to the demanding tasks, high opportunity costs (e.g. watching a YouTube Video) and no costs for leaving the study. The study comprised two demanding tasks: undergoing Moral Identity activation and reading the Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario. On the one hand many participants could have felt objected to writing a story about personal moral behaviour. Writing the stories in the Moral Identity activation condition is thereby considered a more intimate and difficult task than for the control group. Here adjectives were more neutral and general, facilitating the completion of the task. It is possible that more people dropped out from Moral Identity activation condition than from control condition. On the other hand it is possible that many participants who saw the two-page newspaper article (Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario) did not continue the study because they were generally not interested in politics. Maybe the expected reading time was considered too long.

These considerations lead to the two following conclusions: firstly, participants of this study are generally interested in politics. Secondly, participants were less objected to the Moral Identity activation task. In other words, study participants had been highly motivated to complete the experiment. This could have biased the results of this study because Moral Identity activation may work differently for highly motivated people. Plus, Moral Identity activation may work to a lesser extent for people with a high interest in politics and a clear and strong opinion about war. For future studies on war-related topics, traditional paper pencil formats may be a better alternative to online tools. This would prevent high drop-out rates and possible bias in the results.

5.5.2 Methods
Methodical disadvantages and problems of the study have been discussed earlier already (see section 5.3). The measurement of internalized moral standards, in case of this study Moral Consideration of War, as a basis for Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity activation has been realized insufficiently. Implicit measures or proper explicit items could be an alternative to the Moral Consideration of War scale. Explicit items should measure internalized moral standards unconditionally, without direct and indirect Moral Disengagement. An example item could sound as follows: “how moral do you judge war, when only considering the act of war itself without its goals and reasons?” or “When you think of war, what kind of feeling comes to your mind first?”

However, it seems quite possible that internalized moral standards include a Moral Disengagement mechanism already. For instance, one internalized moral standard could be: “war is legitimate if human rights violations are prevented” (‘moral justification’) or another
moral standard could state “war is illegitimate because humans are killed”. Internalized moral standards could comprise different standpoints on war, moral and immoral ones, already connected to a justification. This justification probably depends on individual socialization and learning. In this case the specific situation is important, i.e. which internalized moral standard (e.g. war is legitimate or illegitimate) is more accessible and influences behaviour most. Future studies on moral behaviour should take this into account. Generalizations from a specific behaviour to immoral behaviour should be made with more care as long as categories of moral and immoral behaviour are not clearly defined. With regard to Moral Disengagement mechanisms, it would be interesting to investigate if these mechanisms are used also for behaviour that is not commonly considered immoral, but for instance egoistic purposes or the like.

An additional methodological obstacle was that the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) was left in its original version and was not adapted to topic of the Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario. Study subjects may have been filling out this questionnaire next to last one without applying its contents to the prior scenario. This would partly explain why the Permissive Scenario had a negative (p=0.11) instead of a positive effect on Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).

5.6 CONCLUSION

War involves killing and devastation, whereby most of its victims are usually civilians (Hedges & Anfuso, 2003). These negative consequences are not always associated with war. Soldiers are highly appealed by the adrenaline of the battlefield (Hedges, 2002) and politicians want to protect human rights in foreign countries or defend economic interests. The factors that make war compelling or dissuasive are of interest for social and peace psychological research. Not least because military interventions namely in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and other countries were repeatedly considered politically and discussed vividly in public. This study sought to contribute to this research by investigating: a) why do people support war? b) Which factors could possibly diminish this support?

In summary, most of the theoretically derived hypotheses were rejected. The reasons were methodological shortcomings of the measurement of internalized moral standards concerning war (additional assumption). Further, it is possible that the high drop-out rate of the online experiment biased results. However, when abandoning the additional assumption statistically interesting results were found with regard to the first question: Moral Disengagement
mechanisms were positively related to the support of war (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf et al., 2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006). When Moral Disengagement is included in media it has a reinforcing effect on individual support of war (Meyer, 1972), but does not trigger individual Moral Disengagement as expected (Cohrs, 2008). However, these findings are valid only on the assumption that internalized moral standards judge war as immoral. Because this is by no means granted, further research should concentrate on the exact content of internalized moral standards in different domains. It should be taken into account that justification could already be part of those standards. Further, it would be interesting to investigate if Moral Disengagement works also for moral behaviour. This is theoretically important since internalized moral standards are a basis for Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 1991, 1999) and Moral Identity activation alike (Aquino et al., 2009).

With regard to the second question, however, Moral Identity activation unexpectedly did not reduce Moral Disengagement. Moral Identity activation failed to diminish support of war by countering arguments of Moral Disengagement in media. Apparently, the expansion of the circle of moral regard, due to Moral Identity activation, did not succeed as proposed by studies of Aquino et al. (2007) as well as Reed and Aquino (2003). There is evidence that mediators, such as Moral Identity centrality, could affect the relationship between Moral Identity activation and Moral Disengagement. Additionally, Moral Identity activation needs to be targeted directly at the immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009; Shu et al., 2011). Future research should not refrain from investigating the relationship between Moral Identity and support of war, so that tragedies of war are not forgotten. Since war is as old as humanity, it will be still important to find peaceful conflict solutions in the future.
6 REFERENCES


Evans, G. J., & Sahnoun, M. (2002). The responsibility to protect. *Foreign Affairs, 81* (6), 99–110


7 ANNEX

Table 5: Preference of Remedies for Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remedies</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>F (1,84)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No remedies</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>32.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22.46</td>
<td>31.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23.34</td>
<td>31.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations and observer missions</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>85.56</td>
<td>22.55</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>83.27</td>
<td>23.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84.47</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>75.73</td>
<td>30.94</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>75.68</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75.71</td>
<td>30.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military remedies</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30.56*</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42.02*</td>
<td>31.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36.02</td>
<td>29.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in a single one-way ANOVA using different remedies as dependent variables and Scenario (Permissive and Prohibitive) as independent factor addressing alpha error accumulation of multiple testing.
Table 6: Preference of Remedies for Moral Identity Activation and Control Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remedies</th>
<th>Moral Identity Activation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>F (1,84)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No remedies</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26.53</td>
<td>32.63</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19.83</td>
<td>30.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23.34</td>
<td>31.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations and observer missions</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>78.64*</td>
<td>25.71</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>90.85*</td>
<td>17.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84.47</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>77.78</td>
<td>29.12</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>73.44</td>
<td>32.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75.71</td>
<td>30.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military remedies</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34.69</td>
<td>29.86</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37.49</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36.02</td>
<td>29.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in one-way ANOVA using different remedies as dependent variables and Moral Identity activation as independent factor addressing alpha error accumulation of multiple testing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Es ist unverantwortlich auf den Einsatz militärischer Mittel zu</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verzichten, wenn dadurch ein Beitrag zum Frieden auf der Welt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geleistet werden kann (Moral justification).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wenn friedliche Mittel einen Konflikt nicht effektiv zu lösen</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vermögen, halte ich den Einsatz militärischer Interventionskräfte für</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gerechtfertigt (Palliative comparison).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In schnellen und sauberen militärischen Aktionen können heutzutage</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zentrale Stützpunkte feindlicher Bewegungen neutralisiert und</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kollateralschäden minimiert werden (Euphemistic labelling).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Wenn ein Soldat im Krieg jemanden tötet, handelt er im Auftrag von</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>militärischen Befehlen und trägt folglich keinerlei persönliche</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moralische Verantwortung für sein Tun (Displacement of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Wenn die Nato uns um militärische Hilfe bittet, um einen Konflikt</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>im Ausland zu beenden, bin ich für den Einsatz bewaffneter Truppen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>im Krisengebiet (Diffusion of responsibility).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In the struggle for peace I find the use of military force justified if</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death of innocent people is avoided (Minimizing, ignoring or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misconstruing the consequences)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Menschen, die Andere im Krieg grausam behandeln sind Unmenschlen.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man muss ihnen schonungslos begegnen (Dehumanization).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wenn sich extreme politische Gruppierungen grausamer Verbrechen</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gegen die Menschheit und schwerer Verletzungen der Menschenrechte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schuldig gemacht haben, haben sie keine militärische Schonung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verdient (Attribution of blame)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Moral Disengagement</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Means of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms for Moral Identity Activation and Control Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Disengagement Mechanism</th>
<th>Moral Identity Activation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>F (1,83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral Justification</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Palliative Comparison</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Euphemistic Labelling</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Displacement of Responsibility</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Diffusion of Responsibility</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Minimizing; Ignoring Consequences</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.02*</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.54*</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dehumanization</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Attribution of Blame</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in one-way ANOVA using Moral Disengagement mechanisms as dependent variables and Moral Identity activation as independent factor.
Table 9: Means of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms for Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Disengagement Mechanism</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>F(1,83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral Justification</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Palliative Comparison</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Euphemistic Labelling</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Displacement of Responsibility</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Diffusion of Responsibility</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Minimizing; Ignoring Consequences</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dehumanization</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Attribution of Blame</td>
<td>Prohibitive Scenario</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permissive Scenario</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<0.05, tested with one-way ANOVA using Moral Disengagement mechanisms as dependent variables and Scenario (Permissive and Prohibitive) as independent factor
Table 10: Manipulation Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“I feel as a…”</th>
<th>Moral Identity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>F(1,85)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>student</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part of an association or organisation</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral person</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.27*</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>20.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.83*</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety conscious</td>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Identity Activation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<0.05; tested in a single one-way ANOVA with Moral Identity activation as independent factor and “I feel as a…” for dependent variables.
Table 11: Means, Standard Deviations and Items in German for Moral Consideration of War Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krieg kann ethisch gerechtfertigt sein, um Terrorismus zu bekämpfen</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt missachtet die Regeln eines zivilen Zusammenlebens (invertiert).</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krieg ist grundsätzlich moralisch verwerflich (invertiert).</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krieg kann ethisch gerechtfertigt sein, um Freiheit und Menschenrechte zu schützen.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12: Internalization Subscale of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale in German (Reed & Aquino, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Es würde mir ein gutes Gefühl geben, eine Person mit diesen Eigenschaften zu sein.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ich trage oft Kleidung, die mich als jemanden auszeichnet, der diese Eigenschaften besitzt.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ich würde mich schämen, eine Person mit solchen Eigenschaften zu sein.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diese Eigenschaften zu besitzen ist nicht wirklich wichtig für mich.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ich wünsche es mir sehr, diese Eigenschaften zu haben.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.1 OPERATIONALIZATION PERMISSIVE SCENARIO (GERMAN)

DIE NEUE ZEITUNG

Militärisches Eingreifen in Uwanto?

Der Konflikt eskaliert und forderte bereits tausende Todesopfer der ethnischen Minderheit Bentale. Viele Hunderttausende sind auf der Flucht. UN-Sicherheitsrat beschließt militärisches Eingreifen.


Die Lage spitzt sich zu. Im Internet kursieren Aufrufe zur Auslösung der Bentale und in der Hauptstadt Rabban sind in vielen Straßen Plakate mit dem Aufdruck Kill all Bentale zu sehen. Die systematische Verfolgung der Bentale hatte bereits tausende Tote zur Folge und könnte in naher Zukunft noch viel mehr Todesopfer fordern. Es steht ein Genozid in Uwanto bevor.

Augenzeugen berichten von Vergewaltigungen, Hinrichtungen und tätlicher Belästigung bei den Bentale.

Schließlich hat der UN Sicherheitsrat, nachdem bekannt wurde, dass es in Uwanto zu einer systematischen Verfolgung einer Volksgruppe kommt, sich in einer Notfallsituation am letzten Donnerstag einstimmig für ein militärisches Eingreifen unter Führung der NATO ausgesprochen, weiter auf Seite 2

Hintergrund des Konflikts

Hintergrund des Konfliktes, der bislang zwischen der nationalistischen Organisation United for Uwanto (UU) und den Bentale ausgetragen wurde, ist die bewegte Geschichte des Landes:

- Die indigenen Volkstämme wurden durch die Kolonialisierung Westeuropas zur Arbeit auf den Beamwollplantagen genommen, um die westlichen Tuchfabriken mit Rohmaterialien zu versorgen.
- Radikale nationalistische Gruppierungen der United for Uwanto (UU) brachten immer mehr Leute auf ihre Seite und schürten Hass gegen die Bentale, die für die grassierende Arbeitslosigkeit verantwortlich gemacht werden. Dies wurde von der Regierung bisher zulassen.

Parteinehme der Regierung für die indigene Organisation United for Uwanto (UU) im März. Weiße Waffen fielen in die Hände der UU, woraufhin die Gewalt gegen die Bentale erhöht wurde.

„weil die Regierung Uwantos ihrem Schutzauftrag für die Bevölkerung nicht angemessen nachkomme“. Aufgrund der bereits lananhaltenden Sanktionen, sieht die internationale Staatengemeinschaft kein anderes als militärische Mittel zur Verhinderung eines Genozids in Uwan. Der Auftrag der Eingreiftruppe liegt dabei explizit in der Erreichung neutraler Sicherheitszonen für die Flüchtlinge am Rand der Städte Rabban und Hantur, sowie der Bekämpfung militärischer Stützpunkte von Uwan.

Sollte sich Deutschland an dem Einsatz beteiligen, könnte das als wichtiges Signal für andere Bündnispartner gewertet werden, was zu einer schnelleren Aufstellung der internationalen Eingreiftruppe und einer Beendigung des Konflikts führen und der Dringlichkeit der Situation in Uwan gerecht werden würde.

Der international und diplomatisch isolierte Präsident Schagem beteuerte indes die Wichtigkeit der staatlichen Souveränität seines Landes und verurteilte die Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrates. Er sagte dem CNN vorgestern, „Uwan werde die internationalen Truppen mit aller Kraft bekämpfen, bis zum letzten Mann“.

Experte für militärische Fragen der Bundesregierung, im Interview mitteilte, unterliegt Uwano seit 5 Jahren einem internationalen Waffen- und Ölemboargo, wodurch dem Militär des Landes entscheidende Schlagkraft genommen wurde.


Das derzeitige entschlossene Vorgehen der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft lässt hoffen, dass der bevorstehende Genozid in Uwano verhindert wird.

**Für eine militärische Intervention spricht**...

- Viele Tausende Bentale werden vertrieben und getötet, es steht ein Genozid in Uwan bevor
- Diplomatische Mittel und Sanktionen haben bisher kaum Wirkung gezeigt
- Der UN-Sicherheitsrat stimmte für eine Intervention
- Die militärischen Mittel Uwantos sind begrenzt
- Es gibt eine Nachkriegsstrategie für den Wiederaufbau Uwantos
- Es fehlt der Willen für den Wiederaufbau Uwantos nach einem möglichen Kriegseinsatz

*Die Häuser der Bentale werden mit scharfer Munition beschossen.*

Allerdings wird der mögliche Widerstand als äußerst gering prognostiziert. Wie Bertram Röhlich,
Militärisches Eingreifen in Uwanto?

Der Konflikt eskaliert und fordert bereits tausende Todesopfer der ethnischen Minderheit Bentale. Viele Hunderttausende sind auf der Flucht. Veto im UN-Sicherheitsrat verhindert militärisches Eingreifen.

Die Lage spitzt sich zu. Im Internet kursieren Aufrufe zur Auslösung der Bentale und in der Hauptstadt Rabban sind in vielen Straßen Plakate mit dem Aufdruck Kill all Bentale zu sehen. Die systematische Verfolgung der Bentale hatte bereits tausende Tote zur Folge und könnte in naher Zukunft noch viel mehr Todesopfer fordern. Es steht ein Genozid in Uwanto bevor.

Augenzeugen berichten von Vergewaltigungen, Hinrichtungen und täglicher Angst bei den Bentale.

Der UN-Sicherheitsrat hat, nachdem bekannt wurde, dass es in Uwanto zur systematischen Verfolgung einer Volksgruppe kommt, sich in einer Notfallssitzung am letzten Donnerstag gegen ein militärisches Eingreifen unter Führung der NATO ausgesprochen. ... weiter auf Seite 2

Hintergrund des Konflikts

Hintergrund des Konfliktes, der bislang zwischen der nationalistischen Organisation United for Uwanto (UU) und den Bentale ausgetragen wurde, ist die bewegte Geschichte des Landes:


Parteinahme der Regierung für die indigene Organisation United for Uwanto (UU). Moderne Waffen fielen in die Hände der UU, woraufhin die Gewalt gegen die Bentale erheblich zunahm.

Die indigenen Volksstämme wurden durch die Kolonialisierung Westeuropas zur Arbeit auf den Baumwollplantagen gezwungen, um die westlichen Textilfabriken mit Rohmaterialien zu versorgen.


Radikale nationalistische Opponenten der United for Uwanto (UU) beschossen immer mehr Leute auf ihrer Seite und schütteten Hass gegen die Bentale, die für die grosserhebende Arbeitslosigkeit verantwortlich gemacht werden. Dies wurde von der Regierung bisher geduldet.

1830 1924 1990 2009 2023

Heute
Der Sicherheitsrat war zusammengekommen „weil die Regierung Uwantos ihrem Schutzauftrag für die Bevölkerung nicht angemessen nachkomme“. Allerdings stoppte das Veto Russlands die angedachten militärischen Mittel zur Verhinderung eines Genozids in Uwanto. Der Auftrag der Eingreiftruppe sollte dabei explizit in der Errichtung neutraler Sicherheitszonen für die Flüchtlinge am Rand der Städte Raban und Han- tur, sowie der Bekämpfung militärischer Stützpunkte von Uwantos Armee und der Besetzung wichtiger wirtschaftlicher Bereiche liegen, wie z.B. der Erdölindustrie.

Sollte sich Deutschland an einem Einsatz außerhalb des Mandats der Vereinten Nationen (UN) beteiligen, wie er von einigen ranghohen Diplomaten nun vehement gefordert wird, könnte das als wichtiges Signal für andere Bündnispartner gewertet werden, was zur Aufstellung einer internationalen Eingreiftruppe und der Beendigung des Konflikts führen könnte.

Der international und diplomatisch isolierte Präsident Schagem beteuerte indes die Wichtigkeit der staatlichen Souveränität Uwantos und begrüßte die Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrates. Er sagte dem CNN vorgestern, „Uwanto werde, auch wenn internationale Truppen ohne UN-Mandat sein Land angriffen, mit aller Kraft kämpfen, bis zum letzten Mann“.


Das derzeitige Nichtstun der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft wird jedoch schwerlich den bevorstehenden Genozid in Uwanto verhindern.

Für eine militärische Intervention spricht...

- Viele Tausende Bentale werden vertrieben und getötet, es steht ein Genozid in Uwanto bevor
- Diplomatische Mittel haben bisher kaum Wirkung gezeigt
- Manche Diplomaten fordern den Einsatz

... und dagegen

- Der UN-Sicherheitsrat ist gegen eine Intervention
- Der militärische Widerstand Uwantos könnte zu einem längeren Krieg führen
- Es fehlt der Willen für den Wiederaufbau Uwantos nach einem möglichen Kriegseinsatz

Die Häuser der Bentale werden mit scharfer Munition beschossen. [J].
Liebe/r VersuchsteilnehmerIn,


Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen ehrlich. Sollten Sie sich einmal nicht sicher bei der Beantwortung sein, folgen Sie ihrer ersten Intuition und ihrem Bauchgefühl. Es gibt dabei keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.


Noch einmal vielen Dank für die Teilnahme an der Studie und viel Spaß!
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__________________________

Ort, Datum, Unterschrift