Markus Reinhardt

Exploring the limits of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments

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Kurzfassung in Englisch

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide.
Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.

weitere Metadaten

Schlagwörter
(Deutsch)
Mechanismus-Design, Auktionstheorie, Anreizkompatibilität, allokative Effizienz
Schlagwörter
(Englisch)
Mechanism design, auction theory, incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency
DDC Klassifikation330
RVK KlassifikationQH 430
Institution(en) 
HochschuleHHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
BetreuerProf. Pierfrancesco La Mura, Ph.D.
GutachterProf. Pierfrancesco La Mura, Ph.D.
Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer
DokumententypDissertation
SpracheEnglisch
Tag d. Einreichung (bei der Fakultät)28.01.2014
Tag d. Verteidigung / Kolloquiums / Prüfung29.04.2014
Veröffentlichungsdatum (online)07.07.2014
persistente URNurn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-147728
InhaltsverzeichnisPreface … 7

1. Introduction … 8
1.1. Applications of auction design … 8
1.2. Optimal use of information in allocation processes … 12
1.3. Modeling non-cooperative situations … 14
1.4. Motivation for the dissertation … 16

2. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction for Multi-Unit Markets with Heterogeneous Goods … 21
2.1. Introduction into double auctions … 21
2.2. Setting of a multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods … 25
2.3. Concept of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 29
2.4. Definition of the allocation rule … 31
2.5. Creation of the price vector and the trading bundles … 37
2.6. Characteristics of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 40
2.7. Discussion of the properties of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 43

3. An Alternating-Price Auction for Interdependent-Valuation
Environments … 46
3.1. Introduction into ex-post efficient auction design … 46
3.2. Setting of an interdependent-valuation environment … 50
3.3. Concept of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 54
3.4. Characteristics of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 62
3.5. Discussion of the properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 64

4. Facilitating Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency with an Integrated Electricity Market Design … 66
4.1. Introduction into electricity market designs … 66
4.2. Setting of an electricity market … 72
4.3. Concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 78
4.4. Characteristics of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 88
4.5. Discussion of the properties of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 91

5. Conclusion ... 94

Reference List … 96

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